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Democracy

“Will Colombia end the cycle of violence?” WOLA

wola-cuestiona-abandono-del-plan-consolidacion

Earlier this month, the Washington Office on Latin America published a landmark report on Colombia. This week, the report´s author Adam Isacson was in Colombia.

Colombia Politics looks at WOLA´s analysis.

Isacson´s recent research for WOLA questions the prospect of a military to civilian transition in ungoverned rural Colombian areas under Colombia’s National Territorial Consolidation Plan (Plan Nacional de Consolidación Territorial) and whether such state building programs, greatly funded by the U.S., are in fact receiving the attention needed to be effective. In spite of the glacial transgression of this Stability Operation, Isacson believes that the government should remain supportive.

The PNC, whose predecessors include Plan Colombia and Plan Patriota, took off in 2004 in hopes of establishing some state presence in areas primarily under the control of armed groups. Two main leaders of this project included the then Defense Minister Juan Manuel Santos and his Vice Minister Sergio Jaramillo who concluded that the PNC required support from other government agencies. It received this support.

“By 2010, US$254 million had gone into the non-military side of the Consolidation effort in the PCIM region: 75 percent of it from Colombian government sources (mainly the Defense Ministry, the Presidency and the local departmental government, with most of the rest from the U.S. government), and 65 percent of it for infrastructure.”

Yet, even in La Macarena, a poster child for the PNC having greatly decreased FARC presence, no civilian transition occurred. By 2009 Juan Manuel Santos had resigned as Defense Minister to run for president and his win, and instead of further promoting the consolidation plan, focused on land restitution and peace negotiations. As government interest in the model dwindled, so did that of civil society organizations.

From the eyes of the American Government, the lack of enthusiasm for Stability Operations lies in its high cost and high ambitions, especially during a fiscal crisis. PNC was institutionalized which brought the program to a near stop, reducing the consolidation zones from “51 municipalities in seven regions, from 100 in fifteen regions”. The current Consolidation zones include: Montes de María, Bajo Cauca and Nudo de Paramillo, southern Tolima and northern Cauca, Tumaco and Bajo Putumayo, Catatumbo, as well as La Macarena.

During an interview with Colombia Politics Isacson stated that: “in counterinsurgency there is no room for being bureaucratized”, in reference to PNC’s institutionalization, and when asked what it might take for civilians to finally take control, he mentioned “it need be non-military and without impunity, two principles that obviously have not been hallmarked of consolidation today.” But what can motivate civilians to become involved in reshaping their communities?

The initial consolidation plan did not facilitate a civilian take over due to five reasons highlighted in Isacson’s paper including: bureaucratization, the PNC’s origin in the Defense Ministry, limited budgets, a limited capacity to hire trained professionals to work in rural zones, and the varying incentives between military and professional civilians. Taking those points into consideration, a future refocus on the model could motivate civilians to not only participate, but also to trust in the government.

Therein lies an imperative point to the potential success of PNC: safety. Civilians need to feel secure. Isacson emphasizes that “citizens need to feel safe, asking and listening to what they need most”, which in this case would include providing proper infrastructure to connect individuals with a way to deliver goods or to work in towns and cities, ensuring that there wouldn’t be a land takeover, and that they have some form of job and food security.

Though these sound like basic requests, it has proven more challenging that perhaps originally thought. “What works is giving people the public good that then makes it possible for them to make a living on their own,” says Isacson, who believes that there is hope for Colombia, especially if the Peace Talks turn out favorably. A continued unified support from government and civilians won’t give armed forces the option of stepping in to fill a vacuum, and could guarantee the long awaited transition.

How to prevent another Mayor Gustavo Petro

A Colombian casts his ballot during legislative elections in Bogota

Colombian Senator Juan Lozano this month launches a campaign to change the way mayors are elected in Colombia’s cities, helping to prevent future victories for leaders as unpopular as Bogotá’s Gustavo Petro.

Lozano will present a new bill “as soon as congress returns”, which if passed, would force candidates to face a “second round run-off” should they fail to secure more than 45% of the vote. Petro famously won only a third of the votes in the 2010 Bogotá race, as a slew of establishment candidates split the field. Had Petro needed to face a head-to-head battle he would almost certainly have lost, as candidates coalesced in opposition to his controversial brand of government.

Were Lozano’s plans to get the go ahead from parliamentarians, eight mayoral races are expected to be affected, although as population rises continue, this number has the potential to increase in future years.

Senator Lozano believes this legislation is necessary to avoid the concentration of power in the unelectable. According to the once president of Juan Manuel Santos’ U Party,  the changes will force candidates to present government programmes that have appeal beyond their “base”. In the case of Petro, for example, it is often argued that he has failed to govern for the whole of Bogotá, choosing instead to concentrate on what he considers to be his natural supporters. As a result, Petro has polarized the capital when a strong and uniting leadership is required after years of woeful administration.

In an interview with the newspaper El Tiempo, Lozano also revealed his bill will include a provision for a revision of the constitution to permit the re-election of mayors and governors. Under current laws, such regional politicians are restricted to one, four-year term. Lozano believes that, following the amendment applied in 2006 to allow the then President Alvaro Uribe to fight for a second period in office, there is little logic in limiting the nation’s second-tier leaders the same opportunity.

For Colombia Politics, Lozano’s measures are welcome improvements to what is essentially an anti-democratic status quo. It is, at least on a philosophical level, against the principles of democracy to prevent the electorate from keeping in power a successful and popular politician.

It is also the case that the prospect of re-election is often what drives politicians to respond to and represent better their voters. Nothing sharpens the mind quite like the spectre of an ignominious and humiliating defeat at the polls. Politicians who have at least one eye on keeping the electorate on side tend to do a better job. We as voters too will be more demanding of our leaders if we feel we have to live with them for possibly eight years.

And as for Petro…the campaign to revoke his mandate is under way. The mayor’s unpopularity is almost unparalleled, and he has only been in power for a year. Why? Quite simply, Petro is as far removed as it is possible from the idea of a centrist administrator who governs for the whole of the city.

Lozano is right to point to the short comings in Colombia’s democracy. Had his law been in place beforehand, perhaps Bogotá would have been spared the divisive Gustavo Petro, and the capital would have in power a leader determined to work for all, not just the few.

Colombia’s longest election campaign

candidatos-elecciones-colombia-2010

Colombian politics in 2013 will be defined by electioneering and very little politics according to the noises this week from within the U, Conservative, Cambio Radical and Polo Democrats parties.

With over a year to go before polls open for the presidential and congressional elections it appears Colombia is to endure one of the longest election campaigns in her history.

Presidential re-elections are new to Colombian democracy, following a change to the constitution to permit Alvaro Uribe a second term in 2006. The immaturity shows as the nation’s political class – media and politicians alike – are all too readily falling into the trap of allowing talk of Juan Manuel Santos’ possible tilt at another four years in the top job to marginalize coverage and consideration of policy.

It was ever thus in a democracy? Perhaps so.

But take for example the new year message from Conservative Party leader, Efrain Cepeda. According to El Tiempo newspaper, Cepeda in conversation about the content of the party’s national convention, revealed “we’ll start internal consultation on whether to support the president’s re-election campaign”, the convention will be “purely programmatic”.

Depressing that the leader should admit to a lack of appetite to set out a political and ideological programme for government – surely it is not enough that the Conservative Party appears to be defined only by its support or otherwise of the president. For voters to put their X in the box against the Blues’ candidates, a reason must be presented for them to do so.

Senator Aurelio Iragorri, a co-president of the U Party (on whose platform Santos was elected in 2010) likewise indicated the principal challenges for 2013 will be to define support for the president and to “consolidate” and mobilize “our mayor, governors and regional directors” – in other words, oil the party machine. Far enough, perhaps for this party of government, but it must – as with the Conservatives – work to present a prospectus to the nation. That must come first, party organization second.

Meanwhile, the direction of Cambio Radical will be defined by the moves of their leader, Housing Minster German Vargas Lleras. Like the Conservatives and the U Party, Cambio Radical are within Santos’ coalition government – and it is virtually impossible (ditto for the Liberal Party) to see them not supporting the president’s campaign. Their consideration will be how they work or don’t work with the Liberal Party and whether Vargas Lleras resigns from his government post to head up the party’s list for the senate. Again – it’s difficult to see how the overriding consideration will be anything other than organization.

At least Clara Lopez, the Polo Democrats’ presidential candidate has indicated a willingness to engage and “present a programme” to the electorate. But the Polo are an opposition party so it’s more than obvious that they will continue to present an alternative vision. Paradoxically, it is precisely the Polo who should be focusing on internal structures – the party is in some disarray and – due to law changes moving the threshold for representation up from 2 to 3% of the vote – could wind up extinct in 2014, with no parliamentarians returned to the Capitolio.

The media have a role to play in widening the debate, but there is precious little indication they will do so. After all, it’s easier for them to focus on the soap opera of (to paraphrase from King Lear), who’s in and who’s out, who’s up and who’s down. Personality is always cheaper and easier to cover than the politics.

Colombia Politics is by no means immune to this either.

Despite this, we should expect Santos himself to focus on what defines him, what makes him a re-electable candidate. In his new year message, the president chose to focus precisely on the area where he knows his opponents will try to hit him – on security. While in Cali, Santos listed his government’s achievements in bringing down the homicide rate, of taking out 25 of the FARC’s top militants, and the killing or capturing of all the leaders of the so-called BACRIM criminal groups. Santos’ message is that – yes, he is continuing Uribe’s tough stance – but that he is doing it his own way. Colombia Politics expects Santos will be bold over the coming year and present a policy platform that is both tough and liberal – the archetypal “Third Way” of which he is so enamoured.

As Santos sets out his vision, however, congressmen concerned with securing their own re-election and future roles in government will hedge their bets, and calculate whether to throw their support behind Santos or to position themselves elsewhere – depending on the prevailing wind.

Ideology is often lost to the political gene of self-preservation.

Colombia´s Police & Military to get the vote?

Colombian army, citizens in uniform? photo EFE

Colombia´s Senate Vice President, Edgar Espindola Niño has sparked controversy with an initiative to allow serving military and police officers to vote in elections, something they have been denied for over half a century.

President Lleras Camargo famously cast Colombia´s armed forces as “guarantors of democracy”. Neutrality was expected of these guardians.

Espindola, and those who support his initiative, see that Colombia is not the country it was in Lleras Camargo´s day. “The Violence” is over, the National Front´s rule is a distant memory, and the 1991 Constitution put an end to the old two party state in which Conservatives and Liberals alternated power. In pluralist Colombia, the threats to democracy have evolved.

There are those like the columnist and broadcaster Laura Gill who go further, claiming that voting is a fundamental human right.  For Gill, the Colombian constitution violates this right to universal suffrage, and treats the army and the police as second class citizens.

Defence Minister, Pinzón too has lent his support to the initiative, although he was quick to confirm that the government has yet to establish an official line.

In contrast, those against the proposal, say that while the right to vote is fine in other countries like the USA, Chile, Argentina, Spain and Great Britain, Colombia´s democracy is not ready for this change; that the possible abuses of power are too great.  They fear that allowing the near 460,000 active forces the vote could distort the electoral process.

Primero Colombia, the Uribista think tank, published an article claiming the hierarchical nature of the army would lead to a form of block voting.

It said:

“It is naïve to think that soldiers and police officers will vote against their commanders, and naïve to think these commanders won´t try to influence or even order their subordinates to vote one way or the other.”

Most would conclude that this argument greatly discredits the armed and police forces, their ability to reason, and their capacity for independence of thought.

But for those who follow this line of thinking, Venezuela is the perfect test case. Chávez changed the constitution in 1999, sanctioning the army´s involvement in the state. The military is now a crucial part of the Chávez electoral machine.

But in Venezuela the army has been revolutionized, and placed under the control of comandante Chávez. And the proposals before the Colombian Congress share very little in common with what has happened in the Bolivarian Republic.

So, it is worth being clear exactly what Espindola´s law would and wouldn´t allow.

The legislation is precise. The forces would not be allowed to convene party events, participate actively in campaigns or run for office. In other words there is no threat that the military top brass could be seen on the election trail urging the public to vote one way or the other (at least not legally).

Colombia would not become Venezuela, and the ballot box would be the only place where the forces´ politics would be exercised.

This is a debate which divides those on the right (Uribe himself has called the proposal wrong and erroneous), as it does too for those on the left. The side of the fence you sit on depends more on your optimism or otherwise, both in terms of democracy as an abstract idea, and more specifically in the case of Colombia.

Colombia is far from having a perfect system, but the only way of solving its problems of democracy is with more democracy.

Finally, it must be remembered that this debate is not taking place in isolation. Should the peace talks prove successful, should the FARC demobilize, and should former combatants enter politics, well it will seem even more absurd that the military are denied even the right to vote.

Bogotá based journalist Richard McColl reported last month, on the BBC, that the military are concerned about how, particularly if they are denied a role in the democratic process, they might be treated once peace is secured. Col Bahamon told him:

“Why can’t we get the right to vote, after all we have been defending the country and fighting for her for 60 years?”

Shouldn´t we give the military and police a vote?  Aren´t they citizens – albeit citizens in uniform?

Democratic dawn in Colombia?

The infamous indignados

Colombia may have one of Latin America´s oldest and longest running democracies but the criticism has always been that hers is a democracy only at the time of an election, that away from the physical act of voting, the society has very little involvement in the running of the country.

2012 is beginning to look like the year this began to change.

Citizen movements are growing more vocal and more active by the day, and what is more important, they are starting to achieve success, forcing the government to change policy and securing the resignation of key political figures.

Last year university students struck a blow to the Santos regime´s efforts to reform the education system. Mass protests, strikes and closures left the president with little alternative but to shelve his roundly crticised legislation. Santos promised that a new bill would be shaped through dialogue with the representatives of the student movement. The government was learning to rely on the input of the electorate.

This victory was followed up earlier this summer by a group of internet indignados who plunged the country into constitutional chaos, forcing the president effectively to veto a law he had taken two years to get through congress.

Following congress´ vote in favour, the Justice Reform bill was supposed to receive the rubber stamp from Santos. But as it made its way to the Casa de Nariño, concerned citizens uncovered a series of last minute amendments that had been attached to the law. These amendments delivered virtual impunity for parliamentarians, and would have allowed those already convicted for `parapolitics` to walk free.

Appalled at this affront to democracy the #SeMueveLaContraReforma hastag was established, a Facebook page quickly constructed and an internet war initiated.  The venom spread throughout the nation and the clamour for heads to roll grew riotous. Within hours the president appeared on television for a rare address promising to stand tall against the rank corruption of ´the few´ in parliament.

The Justice Reform bill was supposed to be an emblematic piece of legislation, a defining act for the Santos administration. Thanks to ordinary Colombians it was prevented from ever becoming law.

The latest episode in this shift of power from the centre to the people comes just months after this ´point-of-departure´ episode. Over recent days an internet campaign to bar the re-election of ultra-conservative Alejandro Ordóñez as Inspector General has once again ignited the fervour of the masses.

Ordóñez is a controversial figure, and there are many who see his views as incompatible with his role as the top legal defender of public interest.

Ordóñez is a man who believes the morning after pill is a form of abortion, that attacks gay rights and, it is accused, mixes his role with proclamations of religious and political belief.

To minority groups in particular his is the unacceptable face of the moralising right. To others however, he is a top lawyer who has, during his four years in power, delivered major blows against the corrupt, taking down leading figures with ties to para-militaries.

The argument that Ordóñez should not stand for re-election is a futile one. He is entitled to do so under the provisions of the constitution.

For now Ordóñez appears to have the support of the major political parties and he is almost certain to win. The game can only change if another candidate were to emerge, but so far this looks unlikely.

With a lack of a credible alternative candidate to Ordóñez, it is difficult to see how the citizens will this time make their voice heard.

Ordóñez could never hold a major public position in the majority of Western European countries. His views would be castigated by the press and the voters, he would be forced from office; the political class would not be able to save him.

Given his relative safety in Colombia, is it too early to predict a democratic dawn here?  Is the move from an elective to a participative democracy still but a dream?

Yes and no. Changes in political systems are processes, often gradual ones that meet with resistance from those in control.

The political élite in Colombia governs from ivory towers, and it is difficult, if not impossible, for ´ordinary folk´ to scale them.

Colombia is changing but the rate of change here is slow, the interests in maintaining the status quo too great.

The power of social networks is often hyped, but in a country where the traditional media and the political class occupy the same corridors of power, the near unadulterated democracy of Twitter and of Facebook has greater force than in more traditionally participative countries.

Politicians are being forced to be more aware of their electorate. This is undeniably a healthy development for the country. Whether Ordóñez deserves to be a victim of this movement is irrelevant.

“When the people fear their government, there is tyranny; when the government fears the people, there is liberty.” Thomas Jefferson

Also published on Redes Colombia

Colombia’s supreme court threatens free speech

Colombia´s Supreme Court of Justice

Colombians worry their free speech is under threat following the move by the Supreme Court to charge journalist Cecilia Orozco Tascón with slander.

Although no charges have been raised against Duzán, Orozco appears likely to face trial as Chief Prosecutor, Alejandro Odoñez confirmed she has a case to answer.

Two articles highly critical of the court, written by Orozco, the director of a news television channel Noticias Uno, and Semana columnist María Jimena Duzán, were adjudged by the court to have crossed the boundaries of press freedom.

Through a communique issued by the penal committee on Thursday, the country learnt that  court will not allow ‘injurious’ and ‘slanderous’ comment against the institution.

For years politicians have tried unsuccessfully to quiet the journalist’s voice in Colombia. Is the Supreme Court now succeeding where they failed? Is this the beginning of the end for press liberty in Colombia?

A threat to freedom of speech?

Colombia is considered perhaps the most stable democracy in Central or South America. It might be victim to the jealous gaze of narco-terrorists (from the right and the left), but Colombia’s constitution offers a system of checks and balances that has maintained a relatively secure, if not entirely participative, democracy.

Military coups might be a signature of Latin America’s recent history, but in Colombia dictatorial leaders have little currency. Votes are cast and results are respected.Colombians view with pity their Ecuadorean and Venezuelan neighbours who live with the rampant despotism of Rafael Correa and Hugo Chávez. Citadels to 21st Century socialism loom threateningly over Colombia’s borders, seeking influence through their ideological and financial support of guerrilla groups, the FARC and ELN.

Hugo’s ‘Bolivarian revolution’ (in supposed honour of the great South American liberator, Simón Bolívar), copied by Correa, has crushed free-speech, forcing privately run opposition media to close or reduce output, and in their place has installed monolithic state-controlled propaganda machines. So absurdly obsequious is Venezuela to her ‘Commandante’, that Chávez’ Tweets are now sent as text messages to the phones of millions of voters.

Until this week a cozy consensus has existed that Colombia represents a regional counter-balance to this orgy of left-wing loony-ism, a country where liberalism and freedom is respected. The Supreme Court’s communique has seriously challenged this view.

By charging Orozco and by giving Duzán the severe ticking-off that it has, the court is effectively sanctioning the criminalisation of opinionin Colombia.So what does the court take issue with? It argues that the journalists’ opinions ‘call into question the honesty and the transparency of the court and its members’. The good name of the institution must be defended, they assert.

But reading these articles it is impossible to see where the court hopes to prove slander and injury. The accusations the journalists put are that the court has become more subject to ‘clientalism’ and ‘bureaucracy’ that it is ‘subordinated’ it to the ‘parliament and the attorney general’. Essentially, Orozco and Duzán imply the interests of the court lie more in self-preservation, than in safeguarding the constitution. 

The truth is that whether or not the court works hand in glove with those it judges, or whether it has become clientalised are assertions that should be challenged in public, proven wrong through debate, not through legal process.

The supreme court could have taken to the airwavesto try to prove Orozco and Duzán wrong, by hiding behind criminal charges it is displaying what guests on the leading radio programme, Hora 20, have called an unforgivable ‘arrogance’.

During the Uribe years, the Supreme Court played a crucial role in the preservation of the branches of power, eventually overturning the ex-president’s efforts to amend the constitution a second time to permit his third mandate. It won enemies within Uribism, but friends among those who feared the accumulation and over-centralisation of power in the president’s office.

For the country’s columnists the court has since failed to live up to its obligation to the Colombian state.

Ultimately, the legitimacy of the court is derived from its role in preserving democracy.

By sacrificing the nation’s freedom-of-speech, and by hiding behind legal constructs instead of facing the public, the court is appears at once to be creating, undermining and acting above, the law.

If the court is wrong to press these charges, is it still an exaggeration to see them as a threat to free speech? Colombia’s commentariat doesn’t think so. Respected journalists and opinion writers have virtually unanimously attacked the court – Daniel Samper Ospina, director of SOHO suggested the court had ‘put us at the level of Venezuela and Ecuador’ while the political analyst Claudia López called it a ‘shameful’ decision, that threatens the ability of opinion writers to do their job.

So who will win, the courts or public opinion and freedom?

The magistrates on Colombia’s highest legal body have recently endured a torrid time in the court of public opinion. The body has been accused of lobbying for those clauses within the ill-fated Justice Reform bill that  were designed to deliver significant benefits both for the institution and its members.

This bill caused outrage with the public who forced the president to ditch it what they saw as entirely self-serving law for the governing class. As the court further isolates itself from the public it jeopardises the legitimacy that popular consent provides.

Whilst it is true that the Supreme Court in Colombia fought heroically against the ‘parapoliticos’ during the last government, an attack on freedom of speech cannot be tolerated. The abuses of power by Colombia’s neighbours must not begin to find a home here. The role of the Supreme Court as a body that preserves the constitution must be supported. We must talk it down from the ledge from which it appears desperate to plunge.

Also published on Redes Colombia

Colombia’s Twitter revolution kills off another top public figure

A friend to phone? Photo, El Tiempo

Colombia’s internet indignados have struck again, this time ending the career of Emilio Otero, the controversial Senate Secretary caught in the eye of the storm as the nation revolts against a congress they view as decadent and self-serving. 

Otero yesterday morning announced he would not be seeking re-election to a post he has occupied since 2002 and for which he commanded an annual salary of over two hundred thousand US dollars. 

The game was up as the hastag #ChaoEmilioOtero trended earlier this week and as senators took to the airwaves to distance themselves from the man (fairly or otherwise) seen to symbolise the moral decay of the political class. Pushed out just two years after he was sworn in for his fifth term with 87% support from parliamentary colleagues, Otero’s life as one of the nation’s most powerful public administrators has come to an abrupt end.
Who is the Senate Secretary?
Elected every two years the Senate Secretary (SS) is a figure little known outside the Capitolio but one who enjoys great privilege and power within it. He is responsible for setting the agenda for congressional sessions; programming – deciding the fate of – legislative initiatives that come before the chamber. And perhaps even more importantly for those who tread the boards of the political stage, the SS is the official who dishes out the offices and armoured vehicles; it is he who patronises grace and favour. 
Otero himself has office space sufficient to accommodate not only his ten advisers but also to receive in comfort his constant stream of visitors. Those who pass through his doors are ministers of state, old timers, or newly elected members, all with demands on congress’ time – to promote their own particular pet project.
For ten years Otero arbitrated proceedings in the upper house. He recorded those present and those absent from debates, helped push through (or allowed to sink) proposed new laws, and decided the bill amendments to be brought before the senate for discussion. 
Who is Emilio Otero? 
Despite his longevity in the post, Otero’s face was unrecognisable to 99% of Colombians until the end of June this year. The Justice Reform bill forced his name into the public domain. 
Otero is alleged to have played a role in the infamous ‘conciliation’ stage of the bill in which representatives from both houses of parliament appended amendments that, among other measures, would have legislated   for (virtual) legal impunity for elected members. 

Congress eventually voted down the bill (having days before passed it) following vehement public opposition and the historically unprecedented decision by President Santos to refuse to rubber stamp the final document. 
A suspicious public began to question the motives of Emilio Otero when it emerged that among these new ‘monkey’ clauses (as they are called in Colombia) lay the provision that any criminal cases against the SS could only go before the Supreme Court – reducing significantly the possibility of a conviction. 

The media investigated Otero’s past and found a number a legal skeletons in the cupboard. Perhaps the most intriguing find was the 1996 sanction by state prosecutor for his alleged discrepancies in the awarding of contracts (a case that was not followed up). To add to this, various congressional disciplinary charges against his name emerged, (including for trafficking of influences, for signing documents from outside the country when the senate was sitting, and for filling a departmental vacancy with a person who failed to meet the basic criteria for the post). Under normal circumstances in Colombia none of these alleged cases would necessarily deliver a fatal blow, but in the context of increased public scrutiny in the revolutionary climate of the days following the passing of the Justice Reform bill, this was very damaging indeed. 
Finally, Otero was not helped by the size of this salary package. Otero’s many years in congress means he is remunerated to the tune of 360 million Colombian pesos, a handsome sum indeed. Any new entrant to the post would receive considerably less on account of a new (and less generous) regime of financial reward. 
The campaign to prevent Otero’s re-election
As the media began to build Otero’s profile, social networkers initiated a campaign against his re-election. Emboldened by the taste of Justice Minister Esguerra’s blood, and the smell of a humiliating government retreat, the twitter-rebels had Otero’s scalp in their sights.
The hastag #QuienEsEmiloOtero trended, first to raise public awareness of the man, then journalists and citizens alike bombarded senators with messages urging them to vote for anyone but Otero. The citizen’s coalition, as it was called, was joined by the former anti-corruption Tzar, Óscar Ortiz González who urged followers to heed the messages within RCN television’s documentary on the senate elections.  

The political class then also began to speak out – Juan Manuel Galán, Liberal Party spokesman in the senate, Amando Benedetti U Party member and former president of the senate, and John Sudarsky of the Green Party, were the first members to announce in public that they would not vote for the incumbent. 
With days to go before the vote  originally scheduled for today – Otero was, however, still hopeful of victory.  Reports circulated that he was due to meet each party grouping and undertake a series of one-to-one meetings with key power-brokers to secure his votes. 

The public discontent, however, was growing too loud for the comfort of certain parliamentarians. Deciding to break ranks, they first suggested that the vote be delayed to allow for consideration of alternative candidates, and then when this strategy looked doomed, some publicly indicated hostility to Otero’s candidature. 

President Santos’ government, through Interior Minister Federico Renjifo urged senators within the coalition to ‘listen to the public’s reaction’, indicating that while it would not take an official line on the SS election, it would not be supporting Otero’s bid. Following this, Otero found that the Conservatives and the Liberals who had always in the past voted for him were this time declining to do so, that Cambio Radical, the Greens, PIN and the Polo were all against him. 

Left with no alternative, Otero announced to the nation on Thursday morning in short valedictory video that he was withdrawing his candidature.

The public and their masters
The relationship between congress and the public has changed – perhaps permanently. The ‘monkey’ clauses of the Justice Reform bill represented a point of departure, the moment when bubbling cynicism exploded in indignant rage. 

Colombians are now more alive to the actions of their governors. Had Otero sought election in a different climate it is difficult to see how he would not have won – the media interest would have been minimal, and the public gaze non-existent. Once he had morphed into an enemy of the public however, his position became untenable. 
The court of public opinion has judged Otero (and the rest of the political class) corrupt. Disapproval of Colombia’s congress is running at 69%. The erosion of public trust in public institutions should concern each and every elected politician. 

Signatures are being gathered to revoke the legislature, to kick out what is seen as a group unfit to govern. And following years of weak and uncritical coverage, the media too is beginning to perform the investigate role a participatory democracy demands of it. 

Those senators savvy enough to smell the danger have acted quickly, sacrificing Otero for the sake of the institution’s future. Despite weeks of lobbying the SS has been abandoned by colleagues. 

The nation shall shed no tears, nor shall those who believe the growing interest and power of citizen movements can only be healthy for Colombia’s democracy.

Also published on redescolombia 

A Colombian revolution? Nation turns on political class

Revolution?

In the face of overwhelming public opposition Juan Manuel Santos’ government was this week forced to ditch one of its most prized pieces of legislative reform. Reaction to the Justice Reform bill has caused a constitutional crisis threatening to take the government, the congress and the political class with it. 
The bill passed by congress early last week was supposed to represent the culmination of two years of hard legislative graft; the government’s centrepiece reform of this congressional session. At the 11th hour, however, a committee of congressmen hijacked the reforms, introducing clauses that would have generated chaos in Colombia’s justice system.
The most controversial of these clauses would have stripped the Supreme Court’s power to investigate the alleged crimes of legislators, in effect delivering Colombia’s top politicians virtual impunity: Those already in jail, for example the 44 congressmen convicted of ties with the Paramilitaries, would be released, and those legislators currently on trail – including the 100 or so cases that the Supreme Court has pending – would walk free, without further investigation. 
Citizens armed with 140 Twitter characters and the airwaves of the traditional media, whipped up a fury  that shook the presidential palace. Within hours of receiving the bill for rubber stamping, President Santos blocked its progression. 

No president had before refused to sign-off congress approved constitutional amendments.
Public disgust at the reforms has led to a double-digit dip in support for Santos, it has ended (at least temporarily) the political career of the Justice Minister, Juan Carlos Esguerra, and has put the country’s legislators on notice. Signatures are being collected for a referendum not only on the Colombian justice system, but also on whether to dissolve the congress. 

Colombia’s ‘internet indignados’ thirst for political blood appears likely only to be satiated by an impeachment of the entire political class. 

A week is a long time…
Last Wednesday President Santos received the final version of the Justice Reform bill. Following the conclusion of the final debate on the bill – during what is called the ‘conciliation’ period (where differences between the text approved in the ‘House of Representatives’ and the Senate are ironed out) – a group of congressmen appended a series of ‘monkey’ clauses as they are called in Colombia. 

The clauses were agreed behind closed doors – without the presence of the government – and emasculate the judiciary, transferring powers from the courts to the politicians direct. This is a violation of the principles of the Constitution of 1991.
Once the detail of these monkey clauses became public, the nation reacted with instant and overwhelming indignation. Within moments, the Twitter hastag #SeMueveLaContraReforma announcing the formation of a citizens army to oppose the reform was trending. Radio talk-shows were soon dominated not by the usual gossip but instead by the voices of the despairing masses. The fury of the nation had been ignited. 
By early afternoon it had become clear in the Casa de Nariño that the bill now posed a direct threat to the government’s authority, and its popular support. 
Santos feared the hostility of the public would not only direct itself against his government, but could also lead to the formation of a bona fide political movement. Santos recalled the events of the autumn of last year when the country’s universities ground to a halt as students protested against Santos’ education reform, a bill that eventually Santos was forced to ditch. 
Forced to act, Santos interrupted the television schedules to speak directly to the nation. He told us he was returning the bill to congress – he was refusing to rubber stamp it, as is his constitutional duty says he must. 

A constitutional muddle

But constitutional experts and opposition politicians reminded the country that the president has no power of veto on congress approved changes to the constitution. In these circumstances the executive is powerless to refuse the will of legislature. 

With Santos’ will expressed but uncertainty over what possible steps were available to the government the  flames of discontent began to lick at the presidential palace. 

The #SeMueveLaContraReforma group returned to Twitter to promote the idea of a referendum. The group promised a popular vote on remaking the justice system and also on the dissolution of the congress. The movement was joined by Polo Democrat politicians and Angela Robledo of the Green Party. 

The crisis appeared to engulf the political class. The careers of some of the country’s leading politicians were being torn apart at the seams as the media sought to lay blame. Justice Minister, Juan Carlos Esguerra decided to resign arguing that he was not to blame but that he would ‘assume political responsibility’ for the imbroglio.
With no obvious way out of the constitutional stand-off appearing available, the danger to the Santos administration was growing by the minute. The government began to exert pressure on the congress to sit on the document – preventing it from being printed and passing onto the statute books. Juan Manuel Corzo –  President of the Senate – appeared to consent to this. 

Talk grew, however, that congress’ original assent was enough for the legislative provisions to be applied as law. The prospect of the cell doors unlocking to release convicted politicians back onto the streets, free to stand for election again, became very real. 

Santos then received a letter from Simon Gaviria, Director of the Liberal Party and President of congress’ lower house in which the Liberal Party promised to – should Santos convene a series of emergence sessions of congress – vote down the entire bill (not just the monkey clauses), preventing its passage.

Santos duly announced that he was convening two special sessions of congress for Wednesday and Thursday and corralled his coalition troops to vote to bury the bill.
Yesterday, after 12 hours of discussion, 107 representatives of the lower house, and 73 senators supported the government’s initiative to kill the bill.
The political scars of the bloodless ‘revolution’
Last year President Santos enjoyed approval ratings in the 80%s. A poll taken today shows that less than half the nation continues to approve of the president.
Santos is said also to have lost significant political capital. Members of his coalition government are angry at being asked to vote down a reform of which days before they had been whipped to vote in favour of. 
Senator Luis Fernando Duque accused the government of treating them ‘like rats, like criminals’. Senator While Roy Barreras, the in-coming Senate President complained at the break down in communication between the National Unity coalition and the executive – ‘we only hear about the government’s political decisions through the press’, he said.
An eventual break-up – or restructuring – of Santos’ National Unity coalition, as a result of this episode, has even been hinted at. Senator Efrain Cepeda, President of the Conservative Party (a key group within the coalition) warned ‘we remain in the National Unity (coalition), but it’s quite another thing how the relations will be’ once congress reconvenes after the holiday period.
All this means that questions about how Santos will be able to drive through future reforms will now be raised with increasing frequency. Will he be able to rely on the support of congress without making significant concessions, for example?
We are still two years away from the election, but the chess pieces are starting to move. Certain commentators question whether this week has thrown Santos’ chances of re-election.
For all the talk of the threat to Santos, however, it remains true that the president saw the danger once the public began to revolt. Without Santos’ intervention the entire political class would be making its way onto the endangered species list.