Author: Ana Baracaldo

“Will Colombia end the cycle of violence?” WOLA

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Earlier this month, the Washington Office on Latin America published a landmark report on Colombia. This week, the report´s author Adam Isacson was in Colombia.

Colombia Politics looks at WOLA´s analysis.

Isacson´s recent research for WOLA questions the prospect of a military to civilian transition in ungoverned rural Colombian areas under Colombia’s National Territorial Consolidation Plan (Plan Nacional de Consolidación Territorial) and whether such state building programs, greatly funded by the U.S., are in fact receiving the attention needed to be effective. In spite of the glacial transgression of this Stability Operation, Isacson believes that the government should remain supportive.

The PNC, whose predecessors include Plan Colombia and Plan Patriota, took off in 2004 in hopes of establishing some state presence in areas primarily under the control of armed groups. Two main leaders of this project included the then Defense Minister Juan Manuel Santos and his Vice Minister Sergio Jaramillo who concluded that the PNC required support from other government agencies. It received this support.

“By 2010, US$254 million had gone into the non-military side of the Consolidation effort in the PCIM region: 75 percent of it from Colombian government sources (mainly the Defense Ministry, the Presidency and the local departmental government, with most of the rest from the U.S. government), and 65 percent of it for infrastructure.”

Yet, even in La Macarena, a poster child for the PNC having greatly decreased FARC presence, no civilian transition occurred. By 2009 Juan Manuel Santos had resigned as Defense Minister to run for president and his win, and instead of further promoting the consolidation plan, focused on land restitution and peace negotiations. As government interest in the model dwindled, so did that of civil society organizations.

From the eyes of the American Government, the lack of enthusiasm for Stability Operations lies in its high cost and high ambitions, especially during a fiscal crisis. PNC was institutionalized which brought the program to a near stop, reducing the consolidation zones from “51 municipalities in seven regions, from 100 in fifteen regions”. The current Consolidation zones include: Montes de María, Bajo Cauca and Nudo de Paramillo, southern Tolima and northern Cauca, Tumaco and Bajo Putumayo, Catatumbo, as well as La Macarena.

During an interview with Colombia Politics Isacson stated that: “in counterinsurgency there is no room for being bureaucratized”, in reference to PNC’s institutionalization, and when asked what it might take for civilians to finally take control, he mentioned “it need be non-military and without impunity, two principles that obviously have not been hallmarked of consolidation today.” But what can motivate civilians to become involved in reshaping their communities?

The initial consolidation plan did not facilitate a civilian take over due to five reasons highlighted in Isacson’s paper including: bureaucratization, the PNC’s origin in the Defense Ministry, limited budgets, a limited capacity to hire trained professionals to work in rural zones, and the varying incentives between military and professional civilians. Taking those points into consideration, a future refocus on the model could motivate civilians to not only participate, but also to trust in the government.

Therein lies an imperative point to the potential success of PNC: safety. Civilians need to feel secure. Isacson emphasizes that “citizens need to feel safe, asking and listening to what they need most”, which in this case would include providing proper infrastructure to connect individuals with a way to deliver goods or to work in towns and cities, ensuring that there wouldn’t be a land takeover, and that they have some form of job and food security.

Though these sound like basic requests, it has proven more challenging that perhaps originally thought. “What works is giving people the public good that then makes it possible for them to make a living on their own,” says Isacson, who believes that there is hope for Colombia, especially if the Peace Talks turn out favorably. A continued unified support from government and civilians won’t give armed forces the option of stepping in to fill a vacuum, and could guarantee the long awaited transition.

Colombia´s infrastructure needs

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Colombia´s road infrastructure in both urban and rural settings makes for difficult transportation and is one of the reasons, as highlighted by the World Bank, for the country’s lack of economic competitiveness. With mostly one lane intercity highways, it often means that accidents or potholes cause long delays and increased costs for delivery; add to this the wear and tear of the vehicles and the movement of goods become less and less economically efficient.

Attempts to rectify this most fundamental of requirements for a modern, functioning country are of course on-going, and progress is being made, but all the work and improvements have come with their own set of challenges causing knock on delays and bottlenecks on already congested roads.

Nevertheless, in ushering in the new year, President Santos announced approximately $40 billion COP of spending on highway infrastructure, which he said would start 30 different projects throughout the country, all designed to complete the famous ‘la Ruta del Sol’.

This ambitious goal and the significant investment attached to it hope to increase employment opportunities and answer the World Bank’s concerns about the stagnating effect of poor infrastructure on the country’s economic development. The flip side, however, is that as the nation embarks on these major highway projects, it is inevitable that long-term negative effects on traffic flow and environmental impact will be felt.

One current example of this is the transvial between Calarcá (Quindío) y Cajamarca (Tolima), which requires building tunnels through the mountains at a length of 8.5 kilometers – it began in 2005, and is yet to be completed. This project, initially expected for September 2013, has faced several setbacks. It has even been suspended a four times, due to unauthorized changes in the blueprints, water contamination in region, and other irregularities. What´s worse, the Instituto Nacional de Vías (Invías) has failed to contract out the electromechanical work, which could mean we´re at least a year a way from seeing the light at the end of these tunnels.

President Santos’ vision of “connecting [the country] and reducing travel time, employment opportunities, road responsibility and security, improvement in the competitiveness of the production sector, and an increase in tourism as one of the main areas of regional development” resonates with the majority of the population.

Though in pursuing these goals, proper and transparent contracting are paramount if such work is to be carried out efficiently and with minimal environmental damage. But Colombia´s recent history is strewn with irregular, badly or corruptly managed contracting. Will Santos´plan work to avoid delays and harm to those living in the regions were the infrastructure is to be laid down? Time will tell.

2013, a different Colombia? The state we’re in.

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There’s a reason Bogotá is called a city that belongs to no-one. The urban center attracts immigrants from across the country, those in search of work, those displaced, those in search of a better life. A capital city like many and no other.

A drawback of this lack of ownership is that it often provides a ready excuse to show disregard for a too frequently defaced and vandalized public property. Petty crime and violent acts are also “justified”  by this lack of belonging.

An incident this Christmas reveals how this disconnect feeds into a general sense of separation from the state, and the weakness at the heart of efforts to improve security in Bogotá, and throughout the country.

Christmas morning, residents of one of the city’s neighborhoods awoke to the sound of a young man in anguish – he was being beaten by his friends who also wielded machetes and knives as they sauntered off down the street. A call to 123 (the equivalent of 911 in the US) made no difference since the call woke up a sleeping operator who nonchalantly asked the location three times – still no one came to the scene. Later it was learned the fight broke out between friends over a drink and an allegedly stolen CD.

The lack of response from the emergency services exacerbates the helplessness felt by residents in the face of crime, the sensed distance from the state and the government. Most residents were too afraid even to step out into the street to help the young man. Who would protect them? Where would the state have been to defend them? Each time a call for help through the 123 system or any other government-run agency goes unanswered our faith diminishes.

One answer is private security, but this is out of reach for most citizens, the reserve of top public officials and the rich.

The other side of the coin is a Colombia in economic and tourist boom. Since 2002 tourism has risen over 300%, and the economy has doubled. Alongside this new Free Trade Agreements have been signed with the US and the EU, and other agreements are being sought with other markets. New opportunities are opening all the time, and Colombia is on the crest of a wave. A hefty $150 million WTO loan was also secured – a reflection of the government’s sound fiscal management – to assist urban development. The year closes too with peace talks ongoing with the FARC – the first since 2002, and a real measure of the nation’s leaders’ commitment to shepherding the country into new era.

So will 2013 bring the stable and durable peace that the Santos regime and the Colombian people yearn for? Will it begin to bridge the disparities in rural and urban areas?

Having the opportunity to live elsewhere, this author chose Colombia for its intoxicating atmosphere; one that envelopes visitors with warmth from people who are full of charm and hope, with music that penetrates one’s bones and leaves little option but to dance, and cities brimming with stories and adventures.

Perhaps Alex Sierra conveys the hope for the future best when he says:

“Colombian society holds the key to peace. It must look for ways to overcome the country’s deep-routed historical conflicts that only recognize antagonistic relations and the government to negotiate the deep social divide that, ultimately, is a breeding ground for violence.”

Petro´s garbage ´plan´

On December 18th Lime, Atesa, Ciudad Limpia and Aseo Capital will hand over the reins on garbage collection in Bogotá to La Empresa de Acueducto y Alcantarillado de Bogotá´s (EAAB) (The Water Company).

But for a city that produces 7,700 daily tons of waste this de-privatization is uncertain and inconvenient, the plan of action is unclear just days away from its scheduled implementation.

Diego Bravo of the EAAB argued on Caracol Radio that, “citizens won´t feel the change that will take place two weeks from now”, insisting that “everything that has to be done, has been done in order to meet the duty of providing this public service”.

His words offer precious little comfort however; it is still uncertain who will be servicing the six sectors of the city during the transition period. The four companies, whose contracts end on December 17th, plan on continuing their pick-up routes after this date while Mayor Gustavo Petro insists this will be prohibited.

As well as “nationalizing” the garbage collection, Petro´s plan proposes 44 new recycling co-ops pushing the total number of these organizations up to 60. However, this has created unrest within the Unidad Administrativa Especial de Servicios Público (UASP), the entity representing the 14,000 recyclers that collect approximately 1,200 tons of garbage on a daily basis. UASP has organized demonstrations to show its disaccord.

And, worse still, though Petro has asked that the private companies return their garbage trucks, the mayoralty is currently holding a beauty contest for new providers of these vehicles. Daewoo and Mercedes Benz are competing for a contract worth $80,000 million pesos. But if the private companies do not hand over their trucks, the District government will have to wait six months for the new dustcarts to come on stream.

The shortage of recycling co-ops, trash vehicles, and lack of an established system do not bode well for the smooth transition Diego Bravo promised.

Meetings between the mayor, Diego Bravo, and UASP continue taking place in order to establish an efficient system. In two weeks´ time, Bogotá will fully establish not only whether the de-privatization of the garbage collection is as efficient and effective as predicted but also what consequences will arise if the private companies do not comply with the new regulations.

Colombia´s unemployment – education reform required

Colombia and Latin America’s steady economic growth seen in the past year has been put in a new, less favourable, light by November´s The Hays Global Skills Index.

This index produced by a leading global recruiter, Hays and Oxford Economics, showed that despite Latin America’s expansion, the limited amount of professionals in the region poses a challenge for the future development of certain markets, offering a reason for the high unemployment rate.

Though the Hays Global Index does not fully explain the factors behind Colombia’s official 9.9% unemployment rate,  it does shed light on areas that could improve the country´s economic development.

The study claims the most sought after professions are those in the areas of natural resources, engineering, life sciences, retail trade, and finance, with the academics indicating a need for Colombia to refocus its education system to promote learning in these areas.

President Santos professes to have placed education at the heart of his government´s programme, citing it as a key driver of upward mobility, helping to combating inequality, and secure the Prosperity for All mantra of his administration.

The resources for financing the growing demand for tertiary education are still in question, and the disparity between the rhetoric and the reality is perhaps best represented by the current lobbying of the Federación Nacional de Representantes Estudiantiles de Educación Superior (Fenares), the National Federation of Higher Education Student Representative, in order to negotiate a bigger dispensable budget for public higher education.

The challenge for the government is not only to reassess the educational system to better prepare students for these areas of study, but also how it can ensure tertiary education is available to students of all socioeconomic levels.

Help has come in the form of a $46 million USD Inter-American Development Bank loan which Colombia’s Education Ministry is using to reduce territorial inequities, and to provide the necessary tools for educational institutions to create learning environments that strengthen socio-emotional qualities.

The 2008 World Economic Forum on Latin America identified the “need to construct values and skills-driven education systems as the top priority for Latin America to achieve sustainable development”; this remains very much a work in progress.

A decade long study of Colombian education by the World Bank found that a potential solution to the limited availability of the educational system would be to increase loan availability to students through a system similar to that of Sallie Mae in the United States.

For Colombia, the road to continual economic growth, means creating the proper incentives for both businesses and students to fill the skills gap. The country must also work to prevent pull the brake on the brain drain caused by reduced employment opportunities, and low remuneration.

The underlying reasons for Colombia´s high unemployment level requires exploration and long-term solutions: the country´s hiring process is often characterized by discriminatory practices, linked directly to the inequality inherent in both the educational system and the geographically differing rates of economic development.