#peace talks

Colombia and the arms treaty with no legs to stand on

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On April 2nd the United Nations had a breakthrough moment – after years of negotiating the definitions of many terms and at the end of several rounds of revision 154 States voted to adopt the UN Arms Trade Treaty (ATT).

Every year thousands of people are killed, injured, raped or abused as a resolute of irresponsible arms transfers.

Colombia’s armed conflict has seen human rights violations committed by all sides; guerillas groups, paramilitary and security forces. And it is one of the very conflict cases many claim has motivated this Arms Trade Treaty.

What is the treaty for?

The Arms Trade Treaty is the first international treaty aimed to regulate the multibillion dollar arms trade that has been fueling conflicts and human rights abuses.

The treaty seeks to control the transfer of weapons through a legally-binding instrument that establishes common international standards to prevent weapons from failing into the hands of terrorists, insurgents, and human rights violators.

Proponents of the treaty believe it will make it harder for regimes like Syria committing human rights violations, to acquire arms.

Why? It requires each exporter to assess the risks associated with an arms deal prior to trade, and prohibits the sale of conventional weapons where there is substantial risk that the arms will be used to commit or facilitate serious violations of international human rights, or acts of terrorism.

When will the treaty be in force?

50 countries need to ratify the Treaty.

To ratify a treaty, the State first signs it – as many states did yesterday – and then have the document pass through the respective legislative requirements.

Once ratified, enforcement is even then only up to the nations who have agreed to move forward with the treaty.

How will this affect Colombia?

Supporters of the ATT process argue the treaty will strengthen global security, but will it strengthen the security within Colombia?

What effect will it have on Colombia’s 50 year long conflict, fueled by small arms, a conflict that continues to threaten the lives of civilians?

The ATT has no jurisdiction over the domestic use of weapons in any country – it only requires countries that ratify it to establish national regulations to control the transfer of conventional arms.

Despite not turning up to sign the treat, we can assume from the vote to adopt the resolution, the statements made by the Colombian government and their report submitted to the Secretary-General of the United Nations that Colombia will ratify the treaty.

The Colombian government has acknowledged that while the absence of an ATT is not “the sole reason for easy access to conventional arms, the existence of a strong and comprehensive ATT will greatly reduce the likelihood of conventional arms ending up in the hands of irresponsible end-users.”

Let’s assume, for the sake of this article, it has been ratified.

The weapons used to fuel the conflict in Colombia come from a number of sources – national production by the government (production from non-government entities is illegal), government imports and illicit trafficking by guerrilla groups.

Reports suggests that illegal weapons are manufactured in at least five different countries, exported to Colombia’s neighboring states, and then illegally diverted into Colombia.

Many suggest weapons are also diverted from the stockpiles of Colombia’s security forces. For instance, the government of Venezuela has been accused of smuggling weapons to the FARC.

In Colombia the manufacturing of small arms, ammunition and/or their components is prohibited, excluding government manufacture.

Colombia is considered a low ranking country when it comes to exporting weapons – it exports some $8,000,000USD compared with the $54,000,000USD it imports which by world standards is not very high either – So economically the ATT will not significantly alter the import/export landscape.

Yet the supply of weapons in Colombia is not lacking, continually finding its way onto the streets.

According to GunPolicy an estimated 3,100,000 civilians in Colombia own firearms. The number of unlawfully held guns cannot accurately be counted but is estimated to be roughly 2,000,000 more. Meanwhile the defense force is reported to have just 500,000 firearms.

What is even more concerning is that the prevalence of illicit arms or “home-made” firearms and the number of weapons smuggled into the country is one of the highest levels in the world.  To access weapons in Colombia one is not reliant on imports from supplier states.

So will the treaty work here?

While the government is positive, let’s not be fooled – the ATT is not the miracle cure to the conflict nor the gun violence that affects many in Colombia.

The treaty has no effect on weapons already in a country.

Colombia’s problems with small arms and arms smuggling, will not go away with the implementation of the Arms Trade Treaty.

Decreasing incidences of violence and the use of arms in conflict is not just about a more transparent supply of weapons but eliminating both the number of weapons already in Colombia as well as changing a cultural mindset which relies on small arms to commit petty crime and gang violence or to protect in self-defense from those attempting to perpetrate such violence.

This is not to deny the treaty will have some impact, but it won’t solve the problem of the amount of small arms already fueling armed conflict in the country.

How will the peace process with the FARC work with the treaty?

Should the peace-negotiations be successful (and lets plan, they will be), the challenge will be much greater than controlling what weapons cross the border, by whom and for whom. There will also be an urgent need to collect the small arms that already exist in ‘the wrong hands.’

Peace will not come the moment the pen is pressed firmly to a piece of paper. We have seen it in other post-conflict cases whereby the small arms once used to fuel a conflict end up on the streets in the hands of youth looking for new ways to make a living. To avoid this, means getting the FARC leaders to agree to demobilize.

The next step is to actually demobilize the FARC and other rebels groups who have relied on guns to make their livelihood. Also a problem is the fact that the peace negotiations primarily involve those at the top and neglect the wishes, and concerns of those fighting on the ground – not to mention the groups not involved in the peace process at all.

The government has an obligation as well…

Demobilization must be executed in a way that the small arms do not end up on the streets in the hands of former soldiers, former rebels or civilians who turn to violent crimes such as gang violence and robbery as a way to meet means ends. This means, the government ensures that former soldiers and rebels are given other ways to make ends meet; trained in vocational skills, given the opportunity to finish their schooling.

Demobilization isn’t the only answer, it needs to be implemented in conjunction with better trained police force with zero tolerance to gun violence and improved civilian protection and stronger regulations on internal gun control.

Most importantly, it means changing a culture reliant on guns. We have already seen a significant decrease in the access of weapons and gun crimes since Bogota’s days of having the title as the Murder Capital of the World. So we know it can be done!

This is not only important for Colombia, but also for the security of neighboring countries. We need to learn from the case of Libya where we are now seeing thousands of weapons used to fight the Libyan war in the hands of Malian rebels. The international community and the government of the day neglected a holistic approach to eliminating guns.

If ratified, the Arms Trade Treaty might have an impact on ensuring the supply of weapons into Colombia is not increased (although we all know there are other means), but the work on small arms control for Colombia needs to happen from within.

It needs to happen simultaneously with the implementation of the peace negotiations.

The old adage says you should hope for the best but plan for the worst. In the case of Colombia’s pending peace, I would say we need to hope for the best, an effective peace-agreement which is more than just words on paper. This means we also need to plan for the best by realizing post-peace agreement we genuinely address the problem of illicit weapons.

There is a lot of work to be done in Colombia towards eliminating the supply of weapons and this means we need to start planning how to do this now.

Photo, Reuters.

A new Colombian countryside?

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Nine rounds of negotiations, six months later, the Colombian government the FARC  have finally something to show for the talks in Havana.

Agrarian reform was perhaps the most tricky of the five points on the agenda ‘for the termination of the conflict and the building of a stable and lasting peace’, but last week agreement was reached between the two parties.

‘Toward a new Colombian countryside: Integral Rural Reform.’

To recap, the agreement claims to promote ‘radical transformations of rural and agrarian reality in Colombia’, seeking to reverse the numerous effects of the conflict.

While the accord went into little detail explaining the mechanisms that will be put into place to achieve such results, President Santos did reveal part of the  deal while on the radio:

  • Lands for peace fund. Farmland that has been obtained illegally through violence, displacement or any other such means will be placed in this fund and subsequently redistributed to farmers with little access to land.
  • The government will increase decentralised development programmes for rural areas, thus hoping to secure stability for these regions.
  • The infrastructure in poorer communities will be improved, thus making it easier for the government to provide potable water, healthcare and education. Such measures should bridge the gap between urban and rural communities in respect to basic amenities.
  • Schemes will be produced to link crop production and food security.

Will these proposals make a difference?

Transitioning these proposals from theory to action will be tough, but it is essential, in particular, that the Colombian government redistribute illegally acquired land to their rightful owners.

Failure to do so will only add to the conflict dynamics.

Decentralised programmes for the rural communities are, too, imperative if these areas are to grow economically.

And, finally, infrastructure development is key. Colombia´s topograhpy means central government often fails to reach many of its citizens. Many rural communities remain isolated. Improvements in basic amenities, housing and education are urgent.

Uribe’s criticisms

Former President Alvaro Uribe has continued his criticism of the talks in Havana. His resorted to his favourite battleground, Twitter to proclaim:

´Terrorist FARC kills our soldiers and policemen and the Santos government rewards them with a land agreement.’

And:

‘It is unacceptable that the Santos government negotiate the model of the Colombian countryside with narco terrorists.’

Uribe claims Santos has turned his back on Colombian farmers, leaving their fate in the hands of the FARC.

Time trial stage to begin

Colombia’s Congress President, Roy Barreras hailed the agreement as a historic step. He claims: ‘…we have won the mountain stage prize. Now comes the time trial stage until November.’

Time is running out and Barreras, like Vice-President Angelino Garzón, was sending out a warning to the FARC that they will have to hurry up if Santos´ November deadline for talks´conclusion is to be met.

The government are desperate for the talks not to extend beyond the end of the year and into the period of presidential and congressional elections.

Still much to negotiate

However, as much of a  breakthrough as last week´s announcement was, there remain  many points for the two sides to agree upon.

They are yet to discuss the FARC’s political participation, the practicalities of the end of the armed conflict, drug trafficking and the rights of the victims.

Talks on the FARC’s political participation will begin next Tuesday.

The prospect of the FARC in Congress is hotly disputed and polemical. We expect political tensions to heighten and the polarization to continue.

Colombia FARC land reform; in whose interests?

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Colombia´s government and the rebel guerrilla group the FARC last week signed an historic agreement on land reform as part of the peace processs currently underway in Havana, Cuba. Over the last few days I have looked at the detail of this agreement and analysed the historical context of previous violent and failed attempts at land reform in Colombia. This third article looks at the possible interests at work behind this reform.

So whose interests does this reform serve?

Supporters are correct, this reform would never be able to pass in Colombia’s extremely conservative, oligarchic, co-opted, and paramilitarized democracy.

For some, this negotiation represents an opportunity for a social transformation that is as necessary as it is impossible in Colombia’s political system.

Of course the ultimate goal of the talks in Havana is a demobilization of the guerrilla force, but the FARC did not appear out of thin air, and they are the (some would say misguided/arrogant) product of centuries of marginalization of the peasantry.

So will the Agrarian Reform not only reform land, but the power relationships which keep the Colombian peasantry in a state of displacement and exploitation?

Economic Interests

Firstly, the deal says that land will not be taken from those who have acquired their land “legitimately”. But…

Much of the violently expropriated land has the paperwork to prove its legality; the former AUC paramilitary leader Vicente Castaño´s African Palm Oil cultivations, for example.

And the logic of this reform is contradictory. It assumes the “legal” concentration of land (which even before paramilitarism, and even La Violencia, was soaked in violence) is some how ethical or tolerable.

The government will not go after land owners who have gained their wealth “honestly”, but this surely goes against the philosophy of the President’s landmark Victim’s Law which has a reverse onus of proof (the land owner has to prove that the land was acquired through legal means).

Agrarian Reform for me will also have very little impact when we consider the rise of Free Trade Agreements, which appear to be the new economic threat to the Colombian peasantry.  Colombian exports to the US have already decreased, but Colombian imports from the US have increased.

How is the Colombian peasant supposed to compete against heavily subsidized Canadian, American, and European agricultural goods?

How is the Colombian peasant supposed to protect their land from Canadian, American, and British mining corporations?

The answer is that he is “encouraged” to become a part of agribusiness.

The Agrarian Reform promotes a more “productive” countryside and  food security” but it says nothing of food sovereignty which the Colombian peasant movement has been struggling for.

For whom is the countryside supposed to be more “productive”? Who will gain – rural Colombians, the majority of whom live in poverty, or European, American, and Canadian consumers of coffee, roses, bananas, and palm oil?

One of Colombia´s leading political publications La Silla Vacia argues:

“Agribusiness will win because – if one day these accords are implemented – there will finally be a real land market in Colombia, something vital for global competitiveness”.

A reform for the few not the many, but why?

So if the reform instead of being transformative is in fact for the benefit of the business class why was this?

I believe it is a question of democracy, representation and power.

First – the only people who get heard are those at the table.

The FARC leadership is represented by Ivan Marquez, Pablo Catatumbo, and Andres Paris, among others, while the government has brought together the Bogota elite, with former Vice-President, Supreme Court Magistrate, and architect of the 1991 constitution Humberto De La Calle; Sergio Jaramillo, who was Santos’ right-hand man as Defence Minister and is seen as one of the chief planners behind Uribe’s “Democratic Security” counter-terrorism strategy; Oscar Naranjo and Jorge Mora, representing the Police and the Army, respectively; and of course, Luis Carlos Villegas, President of the National Association of Entrepreneurs, who’s daughter had once been kidnapped by the FARC.

So, who is not at the table?

Afro-Colombians, indigenous people, displaced people, people representing victims´ groups, the peasantry, working people, women, refugees, youth/former forced combatants, and most importantly  people representing the communities which still live under the occupation of the FARC guerrillas. In short anyone that either doesn’t represent the Colombian political and economic establishment, the State institutions of violence, or armed rebels.

Santos and the FARC really don’t have any broad support.

Meanwhile the true holders of power when it comes to the land issue is the landed elite represented by the association of cattle-ranchers, FEDEGAN, and their President Jose Felix LaFaurie, and, of course Alvaro Uribe. But Uribe, LaFaurie, and the uribista land-owning class have vehemently opposed the talks, let alone influence the decisions made at the table.

So at the peace table, no one really has any legitimate mandate to say anything on behalf of “Colombians”.

Sure, civil society has been “consulted” within the peace process, having the opportunity to send in proposals to the negotiators online, through forums in the capital, or regional initiatives for peace, but is this anything more than just tokenism?

There is talk of the FARC wanting to create a Popular Assembly to ratify any Peace Agreement, while the government says it is committed to holding a referendum, but even this does not give the Colombian people a proper voice.

The choice will be a false one. Either support an imposed peace or we´re going back to war.

An historic agreement after all?

The Agrarian Reform agreement may indeed be historic. It is a positive sign that this time around the FARC are serious about a negotiated settlement.

The true root causes of the conflict – the relationship between the different classes of Colombia to land, and of that tension to armed violence – however, has only been partially addressed.

The voices of those most affected haven’t really been heard at the table.

The government and an echo chamber of journalists, pundits, politicians, and others are claiming that this will be a sustainable solution to the issue at the root of social and political conflict in Colombia.

Yet it seems that this agreement is far from transformative – it does not subvert how power works in Colombia, but instead reinforces it.

The government, through the negotiations in Havana, represents those Colombians who apparently are the only ones who have ever mattered in its eyes – those with land or guns.

Simon is the owner of the website The Banana Plutocracy

Photo Jorge Silva.

FARC agreement: Colombia´s history of violence and failed agrarian reform

Soldados de la Fuerza Tarea Omega patrullan y revisan hoy 6 de agosto del 2009 en las selvas de Vista Hermosa Meta , uno de los campamentos del frente 27 de las FARC, en medio de la ofensiva del Ejercito Nacional por la captura del Mono Jojoy, miembro del secretariado de las FARC. FOTO MAURICIO MORENO EL TIEMPO

Colombia´s government has signed an agreement with FARC guerrillas for agrarian or rural reform as part of the peace process currently underway in Havana.

On Tuesday I looked at the detail behind this accord, today I turn to history for the lessons we can learn from failed attempts at land reform in Colombia.

Colombia´s land; in the hands of the few, not the many

Like in many other Latin American countries, or post-colonial oligarchies/plutocracies, the wealth that comes from the land has been violently concentrated through different processes (genocide of indigenous peoples, colonialism, the encomienda system, agrarian reforms gone awry, free trade agreements/neoliberalism, and of course armed counter-agrarian reform/socio-political violence) for the last 500 years or so.

For historical reasons and due to the armed violence, however, Colombian rural inequality is particularly stark. 

An astounding 52% of the land is owned by 1.15% of the population. The rural GINI coefficient (the standard measure for inequality among economists) is 0.85 (where a 1 means complete inequality/where one person owns everything). Only a fifth of the potentially productive land is actually being put to use.

Colombia is by no means a naturally unequal place. So, how did we get to to this point?

I don’t want to give a history lesson, but I think Sunday’s agreement between the FARC and the Santos Government is not just a deal within it itself, but represents a significant shift in a process of popular (often armed) mobilization for agrarian reform, and counter-mobilization and concentration by the elite.

This process refers not only to Colombia´s current violence (the 49 year long war and humanitarian disaster) but also a defining aspect of the entire way the nation has been organized since the encomienda.

The history of land concentration

Initially, land was organized around the idea of owning the land that one worked (or had workers on). Later, Spanish colonial government allowed private buyers to purchase government estates, and in 1821, the government allowed the direct transfer of public land into private hands.

Under the colonial regime, land belonging to the Church or to indigenous communities was nominally protected from colonization. However, these rights were abolished for indigenous reserves in 1810, and for the Church later on.

The legalization/formalization of uncultivated public land (baldios) was handled by a government who was (much like today’s Colombia) run exclusively by the elite, leading to the creation of even more large estates for the wealthy.

Land, as a way of avoiding taxes, fighting inflation, and building credit, made it an asset which was more valuable than just what it was able to produce, making it (like in most places) one of the most coveted assets by the elites, leaving little for the landless/popular classes.

The colonization of the Colombian territory saw small-scale peasant farmers pushed off their land, forced to move into more marginal areas which they would then make productive. The landed elites would then (often forcibly) push them off of this land, and in the process expanding their territory and further consolidating its ownership.

The peasants, now landless, would move deeper into the jungle/territory/mountains looking for land. This process to a certain extent still occurs today.

A peasants´ revolt?

By the 1920s, peasants organized themselves and went on the offensive. The elites in turn responded with more displacement. This social conflict resulted in the Agrarian Reform of 1936, which because of faulty implementation (and Colombia being a Plutocracy), resulted in the formalization of property again benefitting the elites.

The Landed Oligarchy, sick of having to deal with subversive peasants, also looked for ways of making the land productive by having more capital than labour, leading to the accentuate of cattle-ranching.

The class warfare was only exacerbated by La Violencia  the civil war between the two political factions representing different sectors of the elite (the Liberals and the Conservatives). Forced displacement became an extremely common practice, and the standard method for resolving disputes over land given the general absence of the state in many rural or peripheral areas of the national territory.

In response to this crisis, in 1961 President Carlos Lleras Restrepo attempted a land reform through Law 135. Nevertheless, again, formalization and the granting of public land led to more concentration.

Only 1 per cent of the land was expropriated from the elite, and most of what was expropriated was poor or low-quality land. Ironically, as the government was promoting land reform, it was simultaneously giving large land owners the benefit of subsidies and tax incentives to increase production, increasing the value of their land, and making expropriation more difficult.

Rise of the narco-bourgeousie

From the 1970s to 1984, the rise of the “narco-bourgeousie” and their desire for land led to the decomposition of large estates, and the consolidation of medium-sized ones.

But while the armed counter-agrarian reform of the expansion of paramilitarism, as well as the booming cocaine industry which laundered much of its wealth in large estates reversed this trend, it also introduced drug trafficking into the historical trend of violent conflict between peasants and landed oligarchs.

In 1994, President Cesar Gaviria Trujillo tried another land reform with Law 160. Instead of focusing on formalization or expropriating land from the elite and redistributing it to the peasantry, however, it worked on the transfer of property through market mechanisms, where by the government would supposedly subsidize 70% of land bought by peasants from land owners.

However, as is evidenced by the case of the women of the Enchanted Valley, a group of displaced women who tried to purchase some land through this scheme and are now not only menaced by armed groups but also by debt collectors, the deal was only real in the halls of power in Bogota.

Paramilitarism resulted in the violent expropriation of 1.8 million hectares of land, or 2.5 more land that had been re-distributed through the latest agrarian reform.

How different will the FARC, Santos Government reform be? 

The Agrarian Reform thrashed out in Havana runs the risk of not being very different from previous failures.

But this reform forms part of a larger peace deal which is suppose to be transformative for Colombian society. and so the stakes are higher.

Have Paramilitaries entered where the state hasn´t bothered to go? 

Sure the “New Colombian Countryside” deal sounds promising, but will it run the same risk as the 2011 Victim’s Law (Law 1488).

Countless courageous community leaders in places like El Choco and Cordoba have been threatened or murdered by neo-paramilitary groups simply for advocating for their land rights.

In Cordoba, there is even a neo-paramilitary group that has deemed itself the “Anti-Restitution Army“.

This resurgence of armed agrarian counter-reform (or perhaps, a consolidation that already took place during the height of the AUC paramilitaries), shows that when it comes to land in “The Other Colombia”, not much has changed in 100 or even 200 years.

The government´s apparently noble policy of trying to help the most disenfranchised in Colombian society is fine, but both the fact that the State is co-opted by the elite, and that the state has no little to no legitimate presence beyond the military in “The Other Colombia”, means it has neither the mandate, authority, or capacity to carry out these reforms.

The State can’t re-distribute land in places it has never bothered to show up for.

Simon is the owner of the website The Banana Plutocracy

Colombia government, FARC “Nothing is agreed until everything is agreed”

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Colombian government chief negotiator, Humberto de la Calle today announced an historic agreement on agrarian reform had been reached with the marxist guerrilla group the FARC, six months on from the start of peace talks in Havana, Cuba.

Previous peace talks shied away from land rights and rural change, an issue which goes to the heart of why the FARC took up arms nearly fifty years ago. But de la Calle confirmed that at last the text of an accord for “an historic change, a rebirth of the Colombian countryside” had been established.

Details remain unknown and will have first to face the public vote, alongside the rest of proposals that emerge as part of an eventual agreement on the five point agenda for the negotiations, but many are seeing today´s news as a signal that the peace process has a real possibility of success.

While international actors, ex-presidents, prime ministers and top diplomats have lined up to throw their weight behind the talks, in Colombia scepticism about their outcome has grown over recent months. Recent polls suggest, while Colombians are willing to support the talks, the majority are rather less than hopeful they will come to anything.

Using the news of this important step forward, Humberto de la Calle and President Santos took the opportunity to ask the nation to renew its faith in the process with the former claiming, “to support this process is to believe in Colombia”.

Opinion remains divided though, and a number of high profile politicians considered to be loyal to ex-president Alvaro Uribe reacted with scepticism. Some argue that until we understand what exactly has been agreed it is difficult to judge whether Colombians will accept the proposals. How much has the government given in to the FARC´s wishes? How far have the government been able to move the guerrilla group?

Anticipating this response, de la Calle indicated there would be “an ambitious programme of restitution and adjudication of lands”, but that “legal landowners have nothing to fear”.

Meanwhile Uribe himself is yet to take to the social media to express his view. The normally hyperactive Twitter account of the ex-president remains silent.

Politicians of the left have enthusiastically supported the news with Piedad Córdoba, Nicolás Maduro and Gustavo Petro effusive in their praise.

Colombia Politics view

Colombia Politics takes a cautious view.

Our editorial line has continued to be in favour of the peace talks, and has remained optimistic for their positive conclusion, despite the slings and arrows of the misfortune of the last six months of stalemate.

At times the apparently remorseless rhetoric has asked us to question and doubt, but today´s announcement is real cause for hope.

However, the negotiations are far from over. Santos has talked of them lasting for “months, not years”, and Internal Affairs Minister, Fernando Carrillo this week issued what the FARC see as an ultimatum that talks would not extend “beyond 2013”.

Yet it has taken half a year to agree on the first of five points.

Sure, agrarian reform might be the hardest of the lot, but on 11 June the Government and the FARC will sit down to discuss the political involvement of demobilized guerrillas.

Remember, all this will have to face a referendum; and if there´s one thing Colombians appear to have little appetite for, it´s seeing señores Catatumbo, Granda, Márquez, Santrich and Timochenko in congress.

Work must still be done to move public opinion, and to move the FARC negotiating team towards an agreement the nation can swallow.

As de la Calle made clear, “Nothing is agreed until everything is agreed”.

We hope for the best.

Photo, University of Antioquia.

Colombian government FARC peace talks, first 6 months

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Six months ago, Colombian government officials and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) came together in Oslo, Norway to negotiate an end to Latin America’s longest running conflict. Time then to reflect on what has happened since.

Both sides are negotiating on a five points, agrarian development, political participation, the end of the armed conflict, drug trafficking and the rights of the victims. But despite the parties making the right noises on the search for a sustainable peace, fundamental differences have been present from day one.  It has been a frustrating period in which nothing – officially – has been agreed, (although the government has been hinting over the past few weeks that an announcement on agrarian reform is imminent).

The high point of the negotiations came in November, when the FARC announced a two month long, unilateral ceasefire. Such a move was intended to create an environment of peace with which the two parties could move forward. The extent to which the ceasefire was upheld throughout the FARC’s ranks however, is up for debate. The Colombian military claimed a total of 52 FARC responsible incidents of violence took place throughout the supposed ceasefire.

The top brass in Havana may have intended the two months to pass peacefully, but the FARC is a fragmented organization; something Matt Ince of the Royal United Services Institute see as the major stumbling block to lasting peace. The ability of the FARC secretariat to enforce a peace accord across its ranks is frankly unknown, and untested.

Ince argues that, as the ideological unity of the FARC has faded, alliances with serious organised crime groups across the country have grown. As a result, the formation of FARC splinter groups (interested more in the lucrative business of drug trafficking than in the political objectives of Iván Márquez and co) in the coming months is, for Ince, a very real possibility.

Throughout the talks former President Alvaro Uribe has been vocal in his disapproval, describing them as ‘…legitimising the terrorism of the FARC’. Uribe, said to building a force to fit the congressional and presidential elections next year, is using this stance against the talks as a political platform. His campaign message is effectively, yes to peace, no to FARC impunity.

Uribe attracts a significant following among those within the influential land owning, entrepreneurial and military sectors who oppose the peace process.

While Uribe´s vocal opposition should have no direct bearing on the outcome of the negotiations, it does little to aid the talks, and there can be no doubt that the slow progress of negotiations is damaging to Santos politically. His current approval rating of 47% is the lowest since he took office, and confidence in the talks within the society is falling.

The truth is, the two parties have found it virtually impossible to progress beyond the first point of negotiation. Talks on agrarian development are in to their eight round of discussions.

Land reform is seen as the key to tackling the social and economic disparity that exists throughout Colombia, the key reason behind the inception of the FARC in 1964. The FARC have been vocal in their belief that large land and farms in particular should be handed over to the poorest communities, while their disdain for foreign investment, in particular the oil and mining industries has been expressed in numerous attacks, including  pipeline bombings.

While no official agreement regarding this topic has been announced however, the understanding from Havana is that an agreement is close. Both parties have reached a preliminary consensus, a significant achievement in itself (which starts to position these talks in a different light to the last negotiations in Caguán.

It´s fair to say the teams began with perhaps the hardest topic of all – both in terms of what changes the government can promise without proposing a dramatic rethink of the Colombian state and her economic model, and what the FARC is willing to concede to.

It is understood that the FARC have relaxed their demands regarding large farm lands, and only seek those that are unproductive to be turned over to the peasant communities. The discrepancies regarding foreign investment however likely remain, and may yet provide a significant stumbling block to an agreement.

If an agreement on point one of the agenda can be pushed over the line then it is possible to see the development of sufficient trust between the parties to make the subsequent battles less arduous.

Both sides are pushed for time. Santos needs the agreement quickly for his re-election hopes, while the FARC – despite what they claim – will be aware that with Uribismo in the congress and a complicated presidential election by mid next year their hope of leaving the battle field to take up a role in the parliament will be significantly diminished.

Photo EFE

60% of Colombians against President Santos re-election

Sabanalarga Educación 03

Colombia President, Juan Manuel Santos faces an uphill struggle to secure his re-election in May 2014 with a poll this week released by Datexco revealing that just a quarter of Colombians would vote to keep in him the Casa de Nariño until 2018.

Opposition to the president´s government is growing, while support for his handling of the economy has plummeted, with just a third believing the nation´s finances are improving and a palty 20% approving of his measures to combat unemployment.

In fact, there is very little for Santos to cheer in the results which show citizen confidence in the administration´s totem issues is at an all time low. On security, just a third give the commander-in-chief a thumbs up, while only roughly the same number are confident of a succesful outcome to the Havana peace talks with the FARC.

On health over 70% of Colombians disapprove of the government´s work, while two thirds oppose policies on both the guerrillas and paramilitaries.

Polling is notoriously unpredictable in Colombia and different polling companies can often produce quite different pictures of the nation´s voting intentions. Nevertheless, the president´s top team should be worried as the Datexco figures come hot on the heels of the news that over half the nation is pessimistic about the direction in which the country is going.

And whether or not Datexco is within the margin of error is also largely irrelevant as Santos´inner circle will know well that this latest set of projections follows a trend.

When Santos entered the presidential palace his approval ratings were even higher than those enjoyed by former president Alvaro Uribe, with almost 90% behind the direction of the new government. But Santos´ popularity has been in virtual free fall since early summer last year when his government was heavily criticized for its failed attempt to reform the justice system. Sure, support picked up in August and September when Santos told the nation of his plans to enter into peace talks with the terrorist FARC guerrillas, but the president´s popular appeal quickly began its seemingly irreversible downwards trend in October/November when the talks began.

Colombia Politics´ view

Santos knows he cannot rely on public backing alone to keep him in power. He must use the full resources of the state, and he must rely on footsoldiers to conjure up the votes. Little surprise then that he announced two days ago his support for a plan put forward by governors and mayors to extend their term from four to six years.

Santos has said he will take the proposals to congress, with his backing. What better way to secure the much-needed support of regional politicians ahead of the electoral battle next year than give them such a coveted prize? What better way of encouraging these important local – and vote-winning – figures to line him up votes?

If Santos can bring together a major coalition of politicians he will be almost impossible to remove from office. I´ll scratch your back if you scratch mine, he appears to be saying.

Polls, public opinion…who cares? Votes are what counts, wherever they come from.

 

A march for politics not for peace

gaitan

It was a hard decision to make but I chose not to march yesterday. I decided instead to reflect on the death of the people´s president that never was, Jorge Eliécer Gaitán, and pray for the victims of Colombia´s conflict.

The national “march for peace” was organized by the Marcha Patriótica (and Colombians for Peace) with the support of Bogotá Mayor Gustavo Petro, and, at the last minute, President Santos.

If we are to believe Colombia´s defence minister, Juan Carlos Pinzón, the Marcha Patriótica is funded by the FARC and its public face Piedad Cordoba, works directly with the guerrillas.

Disconcerting then, that the overwhelming number of marchers appeared to be Marcha Patriótica supporters, unsettling too to see thousands of MP branded t-shirts and flags among the hordes flocking down the Carrera Septima in Bogotá en route to the Plaza de Bolívar.

These white shirts, presumably funded by the MP, bore the message “bilateral ceasefire” (something the FARC have directly asked for). Not the end of the world perhaps, but these shirts were accompanied by banners demanding an end to “neoliberalism”, for the castigation of ex-president Alvaro Uribe, and for “social justice”. There were those that shouted “Uribe, fascist”.

This was not a peace march. This was a political march.

There is nothing more moving and beautiful than seeing a people march for peace, but when that peace is politicized, when the march has such a clear agenda, it sullies and cheapens the event.

Of course it´s also true that there were plenty of “ordinary” folk who joined in the march. Public workers too were out en masse, having been given the day off.  No one can claim that this march was entirely Marcha Patriótica, but that it was organized by them and that they were there in such huge numbers meant its focus was wrong.

9 April is traditionally a day to remember the victims. It is distasteful and disrespectful to the memory of Colombia´s victims, the murdered, the disappeared, and the kidnapped to turn the date into a day for politics.

On 9 April 1948 the great Liberal Jorge Eliécer Gaitán was murdered sparking a near revolutionary force that ripped apart first Bogotá and later the rest of country. The “Bogotazo” was a unified cry of anguish of hopelessness and despair as the people realized the oligarchs of the state had crushed their hope for change.

Gaitán shone a light on a Colombia in which a true democracy was possible, in which the idea of government by for and of the people was a real possibility. As they extinguished this light, the governing classes unleashed an armed conflict that is still with us today.

The FARC has its origins here, in the exclusion of all political actors not belonging to the Liberal Party or the Conservative Party hegemony; the stitch-up that followed the “Bogotazo” was an agreement which saw both parties alternate power, sharing between them the wealth and bureaucratic jam of the state. This, to the explicit exclusion of all others.

Colombia remains governed by this elite. Look at a list of her top politicians and you´ll see sons, nephews, and grandchildren of those who lead the country during the dark days of the second half of the 20th Century.

Gaitán´s death was in vain, perhaps.

But the FARC´s answer, to seize power by brute force, is not the answer. The problems of democracy are always solved with more, not less democracy.

Clearly no march will bring us peace but perhaps, just perhaps, the peace talks in Havana will lead to Colombia´s largest and most recalcitrant guerrillas to give up the fight.

One day the guerilla will leave us in peace. One day they will stop recruiting children to fight their dirty war. One day they will let their rhetoric, and not the lead of their bullets do the talking.

One day the full truth will also out on the role of the paramilitaries in this conflict.

The simple truth is that the right wing militias and the left wing terrorists have no role to play in Colombian politics. There is nothing democratic about using violence to impose political will.

We are all victims.

I want peace, I want the FARC to demobilize and fight for votes, to exchange the bullet for the ballot box. But equally I believe that any march that even whiffs of the slightest minutest show of support for them – or for any other violent actor in our politics – should be avoided like the plague.

Yesterday the vast majority of Colombians stayed at home. The white shirts of the Marcha Patriótica were hardly seen outside of Bogota. The cities of Manizales, Medellin, Cali and many others reported a pathetically low turnout of people.

Does this mean Colombians don´t want peace? Does this mean Colombians don´t support the peace process? My guess is that the answer to both is no. The reality is that the vast majority of us did not feel it appropriate or right to join a march so obviously political, with such an obvious agenda.

Gaitán would turn in his grave!

This article was written for Colombia Reports