Six months ago, Colombian government officials and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) came together in Oslo, Norway to negotiate an end to Latin America’s longest running conflict. Time then to reflect on what has happened since.
Both sides are negotiating on a five points, agrarian development, political participation, the end of the armed conflict, drug trafficking and the rights of the victims. But despite the parties making the right noises on the search for a sustainable peace, fundamental differences have been present from day one. It has been a frustrating period in which nothing – officially – has been agreed, (although the government has been hinting over the past few weeks that an announcement on agrarian reform is imminent).
The high point of the negotiations came in November, when the FARC announced a two month long, unilateral ceasefire. Such a move was intended to create an environment of peace with which the two parties could move forward. The extent to which the ceasefire was upheld throughout the FARC’s ranks however, is up for debate. The Colombian military claimed a total of 52 FARC responsible incidents of violence took place throughout the supposed ceasefire.
The top brass in Havana may have intended the two months to pass peacefully, but the FARC is a fragmented organization; something Matt Ince of the Royal United Services Institute see as the major stumbling block to lasting peace. The ability of the FARC secretariat to enforce a peace accord across its ranks is frankly unknown, and untested.
Ince argues that, as the ideological unity of the FARC has faded, alliances with serious organised crime groups across the country have grown. As a result, the formation of FARC splinter groups (interested more in the lucrative business of drug trafficking than in the political objectives of Iván Márquez and co) in the coming months is, for Ince, a very real possibility.
Throughout the talks former President Alvaro Uribe has been vocal in his disapproval, describing them as ‘…legitimising the terrorism of the FARC’. Uribe, said to building a force to fit the congressional and presidential elections next year, is using this stance against the talks as a political platform. His campaign message is effectively, yes to peace, no to FARC impunity.
Uribe attracts a significant following among those within the influential land owning, entrepreneurial and military sectors who oppose the peace process.
While Uribe´s vocal opposition should have no direct bearing on the outcome of the negotiations, it does little to aid the talks, and there can be no doubt that the slow progress of negotiations is damaging to Santos politically. His current approval rating of 47% is the lowest since he took office, and confidence in the talks within the society is falling.
The truth is, the two parties have found it virtually impossible to progress beyond the first point of negotiation. Talks on agrarian development are in to their eight round of discussions.
Land reform is seen as the key to tackling the social and economic disparity that exists throughout Colombia, the key reason behind the inception of the FARC in 1964. The FARC have been vocal in their belief that large land and farms in particular should be handed over to the poorest communities, while their disdain for foreign investment, in particular the oil and mining industries has been expressed in numerous attacks, including pipeline bombings.
While no official agreement regarding this topic has been announced however, the understanding from Havana is that an agreement is close. Both parties have reached a preliminary consensus, a significant achievement in itself (which starts to position these talks in a different light to the last negotiations in Caguán.
It´s fair to say the teams began with perhaps the hardest topic of all – both in terms of what changes the government can promise without proposing a dramatic rethink of the Colombian state and her economic model, and what the FARC is willing to concede to.
It is understood that the FARC have relaxed their demands regarding large farm lands, and only seek those that are unproductive to be turned over to the peasant communities. The discrepancies regarding foreign investment however likely remain, and may yet provide a significant stumbling block to an agreement.
If an agreement on point one of the agenda can be pushed over the line then it is possible to see the development of sufficient trust between the parties to make the subsequent battles less arduous.
Both sides are pushed for time. Santos needs the agreement quickly for his re-election hopes, while the FARC – despite what they claim – will be aware that with Uribismo in the congress and a complicated presidential election by mid next year their hope of leaving the battle field to take up a role in the parliament will be significantly diminished.
Photo EFE