Peace talks

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A new Colombian countryside?

farctalks

Nine rounds of negotiations, six months later, the Colombian government the FARC  have finally something to show for the talks in Havana.

Agrarian reform was perhaps the most tricky of the five points on the agenda ‘for the termination of the conflict and the building of a stable and lasting peace’, but last week agreement was reached between the two parties.

‘Toward a new Colombian countryside: Integral Rural Reform.’

To recap, the agreement claims to promote ‘radical transformations of rural and agrarian reality in Colombia’, seeking to reverse the numerous effects of the conflict.

While the accord went into little detail explaining the mechanisms that will be put into place to achieve such results, President Santos did reveal part of the  deal while on the radio:

  • Lands for peace fund. Farmland that has been obtained illegally through violence, displacement or any other such means will be placed in this fund and subsequently redistributed to farmers with little access to land.
  • The government will increase decentralised development programmes for rural areas, thus hoping to secure stability for these regions.
  • The infrastructure in poorer communities will be improved, thus making it easier for the government to provide potable water, healthcare and education. Such measures should bridge the gap between urban and rural communities in respect to basic amenities.
  • Schemes will be produced to link crop production and food security.

Will these proposals make a difference?

Transitioning these proposals from theory to action will be tough, but it is essential, in particular, that the Colombian government redistribute illegally acquired land to their rightful owners.

Failure to do so will only add to the conflict dynamics.

Decentralised programmes for the rural communities are, too, imperative if these areas are to grow economically.

And, finally, infrastructure development is key. Colombia´s topograhpy means central government often fails to reach many of its citizens. Many rural communities remain isolated. Improvements in basic amenities, housing and education are urgent.

Uribe’s criticisms

Former President Alvaro Uribe has continued his criticism of the talks in Havana. His resorted to his favourite battleground, Twitter to proclaim:

´Terrorist FARC kills our soldiers and policemen and the Santos government rewards them with a land agreement.’

And:

‘It is unacceptable that the Santos government negotiate the model of the Colombian countryside with narco terrorists.’

Uribe claims Santos has turned his back on Colombian farmers, leaving their fate in the hands of the FARC.

Time trial stage to begin

Colombia’s Congress President, Roy Barreras hailed the agreement as a historic step. He claims: ‘…we have won the mountain stage prize. Now comes the time trial stage until November.’

Time is running out and Barreras, like Vice-President Angelino Garzón, was sending out a warning to the FARC that they will have to hurry up if Santos´ November deadline for talks´conclusion is to be met.

The government are desperate for the talks not to extend beyond the end of the year and into the period of presidential and congressional elections.

Still much to negotiate

However, as much of a  breakthrough as last week´s announcement was, there remain  many points for the two sides to agree upon.

They are yet to discuss the FARC’s political participation, the practicalities of the end of the armed conflict, drug trafficking and the rights of the victims.

Talks on the FARC’s political participation will begin next Tuesday.

The prospect of the FARC in Congress is hotly disputed and polemical. We expect political tensions to heighten and the polarization to continue.

Category: Comment, Peace talks
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Colombia FARC land reform; in whose interests?

farm

Colombia´s government and the rebel guerrilla group the FARC last week signed an historic agreement on land reform as part of the peace processs currently underway in Havana, Cuba. Over the last few days I have looked at the detail of this agreement and analysed the historical context of previous violent and failed attempts at land reform in Colombia. This third article looks at the possible interests at work behind this reform.

So whose interests does this reform serve?

Supporters are correct, this reform would never be able to pass in Colombia’s extremely conservative, oligarchic, co-opted, and paramilitarized democracy.

For some, this negotiation represents an opportunity for a social transformation that is as necessary as it is impossible in Colombia’s political system.

Of course the ultimate goal of the talks in Havana is a demobilization of the guerrilla force, but the FARC did not appear out of thin air, and they are the (some would say misguided/arrogant) product of centuries of marginalization of the peasantry.

So will the Agrarian Reform not only reform land, but the power relationships which keep the Colombian peasantry in a state of displacement and exploitation?

Economic Interests

Firstly, the deal says that land will not be taken from those who have acquired their land “legitimately”. But…

Much of the violently expropriated land has the paperwork to prove its legality; the former AUC paramilitary leader Vicente Castaño´s African Palm Oil cultivations, for example.

And the logic of this reform is contradictory. It assumes the “legal” concentration of land (which even before paramilitarism, and even La Violencia, was soaked in violence) is some how ethical or tolerable.

The government will not go after land owners who have gained their wealth “honestly”, but this surely goes against the philosophy of the President’s landmark Victim’s Law which has a reverse onus of proof (the land owner has to prove that the land was acquired through legal means).

Agrarian Reform for me will also have very little impact when we consider the rise of Free Trade Agreements, which appear to be the new economic threat to the Colombian peasantry.  Colombian exports to the US have already decreased, but Colombian imports from the US have increased.

How is the Colombian peasant supposed to compete against heavily subsidized Canadian, American, and European agricultural goods?

How is the Colombian peasant supposed to protect their land from Canadian, American, and British mining corporations?

The answer is that he is “encouraged” to become a part of agribusiness.

The Agrarian Reform promotes a more “productive” countryside and  food security” but it says nothing of food sovereignty which the Colombian peasant movement has been struggling for.

For whom is the countryside supposed to be more “productive”? Who will gain – rural Colombians, the majority of whom live in poverty, or European, American, and Canadian consumers of coffee, roses, bananas, and palm oil?

One of Colombia´s leading political publications La Silla Vacia argues:

“Agribusiness will win because – if one day these accords are implemented – there will finally be a real land market in Colombia, something vital for global competitiveness”.

A reform for the few not the many, but why?

So if the reform instead of being transformative is in fact for the benefit of the business class why was this?

I believe it is a question of democracy, representation and power.

First – the only people who get heard are those at the table.

The FARC leadership is represented by Ivan Marquez, Pablo Catatumbo, and Andres Paris, among others, while the government has brought together the Bogota elite, with former Vice-President, Supreme Court Magistrate, and architect of the 1991 constitution Humberto De La Calle; Sergio Jaramillo, who was Santos’ right-hand man as Defence Minister and is seen as one of the chief planners behind Uribe’s “Democratic Security” counter-terrorism strategy; Oscar Naranjo and Jorge Mora, representing the Police and the Army, respectively; and of course, Luis Carlos Villegas, President of the National Association of Entrepreneurs, who’s daughter had once been kidnapped by the FARC.

So, who is not at the table?

Afro-Colombians, indigenous people, displaced people, people representing victims´ groups, the peasantry, working people, women, refugees, youth/former forced combatants, and most importantly  people representing the communities which still live under the occupation of the FARC guerrillas. In short anyone that either doesn’t represent the Colombian political and economic establishment, the State institutions of violence, or armed rebels.

Santos and the FARC really don’t have any broad support.

Meanwhile the true holders of power when it comes to the land issue is the landed elite represented by the association of cattle-ranchers, FEDEGAN, and their President Jose Felix LaFaurie, and, of course Alvaro Uribe. But Uribe, LaFaurie, and the uribista land-owning class have vehemently opposed the talks, let alone influence the decisions made at the table.

So at the peace table, no one really has any legitimate mandate to say anything on behalf of “Colombians”.

Sure, civil society has been “consulted” within the peace process, having the opportunity to send in proposals to the negotiators online, through forums in the capital, or regional initiatives for peace, but is this anything more than just tokenism?

There is talk of the FARC wanting to create a Popular Assembly to ratify any Peace Agreement, while the government says it is committed to holding a referendum, but even this does not give the Colombian people a proper voice.

The choice will be a false one. Either support an imposed peace or we´re going back to war.

An historic agreement after all?

The Agrarian Reform agreement may indeed be historic. It is a positive sign that this time around the FARC are serious about a negotiated settlement.

The true root causes of the conflict – the relationship between the different classes of Colombia to land, and of that tension to armed violence – however, has only been partially addressed.

The voices of those most affected haven’t really been heard at the table.

The government and an echo chamber of journalists, pundits, politicians, and others are claiming that this will be a sustainable solution to the issue at the root of social and political conflict in Colombia.

Yet it seems that this agreement is far from transformative – it does not subvert how power works in Colombia, but instead reinforces it.

The government, through the negotiations in Havana, represents those Colombians who apparently are the only ones who have ever mattered in its eyes – those with land or guns.

Simon is the owner of the website The Banana Plutocracy

Photo Jorge Silva.

Category: Comment, Peace talks
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FARC agreement: Colombia´s history of violence and failed agrarian reform

Soldados de la Fuerza Tarea Omega patrullan y revisan hoy 6 de agosto del 2009 en las selvas de Vista Hermosa Meta , uno de los campamentos del frente 27 de las FARC, en medio de la ofensiva del Ejercito Nacional por la captura del Mono Jojoy, miembro del secretariado de las FARC. FOTO MAURICIO MORENO EL TIEMPO

Colombia´s government has signed an agreement with FARC guerrillas for agrarian or rural reform as part of the peace process currently underway in Havana.

On Tuesday I looked at the detail behind this accord, today I turn to history for the lessons we can learn from failed attempts at land reform in Colombia.

Colombia´s land; in the hands of the few, not the many

Like in many other Latin American countries, or post-colonial oligarchies/plutocracies, the wealth that comes from the land has been violently concentrated through different processes (genocide of indigenous peoples, colonialism, the encomienda system, agrarian reforms gone awry, free trade agreements/neoliberalism, and of course armed counter-agrarian reform/socio-political violence) for the last 500 years or so.

For historical reasons and due to the armed violence, however, Colombian rural inequality is particularly stark. 

An astounding 52% of the land is owned by 1.15% of the population. The rural GINI coefficient (the standard measure for inequality among economists) is 0.85 (where a 1 means complete inequality/where one person owns everything). Only a fifth of the potentially productive land is actually being put to use.

Colombia is by no means a naturally unequal place. So, how did we get to to this point?

I don’t want to give a history lesson, but I think Sunday’s agreement between the FARC and the Santos Government is not just a deal within it itself, but represents a significant shift in a process of popular (often armed) mobilization for agrarian reform, and counter-mobilization and concentration by the elite.

This process refers not only to Colombia´s current violence (the 49 year long war and humanitarian disaster) but also a defining aspect of the entire way the nation has been organized since the encomienda.

The history of land concentration

Initially, land was organized around the idea of owning the land that one worked (or had workers on). Later, Spanish colonial government allowed private buyers to purchase government estates, and in 1821, the government allowed the direct transfer of public land into private hands.

Under the colonial regime, land belonging to the Church or to indigenous communities was nominally protected from colonization. However, these rights were abolished for indigenous reserves in 1810, and for the Church later on.

The legalization/formalization of uncultivated public land (baldios) was handled by a government who was (much like today’s Colombia) run exclusively by the elite, leading to the creation of even more large estates for the wealthy.

Land, as a way of avoiding taxes, fighting inflation, and building credit, made it an asset which was more valuable than just what it was able to produce, making it (like in most places) one of the most coveted assets by the elites, leaving little for the landless/popular classes.

The colonization of the Colombian territory saw small-scale peasant farmers pushed off their land, forced to move into more marginal areas which they would then make productive. The landed elites would then (often forcibly) push them off of this land, and in the process expanding their territory and further consolidating its ownership.

The peasants, now landless, would move deeper into the jungle/territory/mountains looking for land. This process to a certain extent still occurs today.

A peasants´ revolt?

By the 1920s, peasants organized themselves and went on the offensive. The elites in turn responded with more displacement. This social conflict resulted in the Agrarian Reform of 1936, which because of faulty implementation (and Colombia being a Plutocracy), resulted in the formalization of property again benefitting the elites.

The Landed Oligarchy, sick of having to deal with subversive peasants, also looked for ways of making the land productive by having more capital than labour, leading to the accentuate of cattle-ranching.

The class warfare was only exacerbated by La Violencia  the civil war between the two political factions representing different sectors of the elite (the Liberals and the Conservatives). Forced displacement became an extremely common practice, and the standard method for resolving disputes over land given the general absence of the state in many rural or peripheral areas of the national territory.

In response to this crisis, in 1961 President Carlos Lleras Restrepo attempted a land reform through Law 135. Nevertheless, again, formalization and the granting of public land led to more concentration.

Only 1 per cent of the land was expropriated from the elite, and most of what was expropriated was poor or low-quality land. Ironically, as the government was promoting land reform, it was simultaneously giving large land owners the benefit of subsidies and tax incentives to increase production, increasing the value of their land, and making expropriation more difficult.

Rise of the narco-bourgeousie

From the 1970s to 1984, the rise of the “narco-bourgeousie” and their desire for land led to the decomposition of large estates, and the consolidation of medium-sized ones.

But while the armed counter-agrarian reform of the expansion of paramilitarism, as well as the booming cocaine industry which laundered much of its wealth in large estates reversed this trend, it also introduced drug trafficking into the historical trend of violent conflict between peasants and landed oligarchs.

In 1994, President Cesar Gaviria Trujillo tried another land reform with Law 160. Instead of focusing on formalization or expropriating land from the elite and redistributing it to the peasantry, however, it worked on the transfer of property through market mechanisms, where by the government would supposedly subsidize 70% of land bought by peasants from land owners.

However, as is evidenced by the case of the women of the Enchanted Valley, a group of displaced women who tried to purchase some land through this scheme and are now not only menaced by armed groups but also by debt collectors, the deal was only real in the halls of power in Bogota.

Paramilitarism resulted in the violent expropriation of 1.8 million hectares of land, or 2.5 more land that had been re-distributed through the latest agrarian reform.

How different will the FARC, Santos Government reform be? 

The Agrarian Reform thrashed out in Havana runs the risk of not being very different from previous failures.

But this reform forms part of a larger peace deal which is suppose to be transformative for Colombian society. and so the stakes are higher.

Have Paramilitaries entered where the state hasn´t bothered to go? 

Sure the “New Colombian Countryside” deal sounds promising, but will it run the same risk as the 2011 Victim’s Law (Law 1488).

Countless courageous community leaders in places like El Choco and Cordoba have been threatened or murdered by neo-paramilitary groups simply for advocating for their land rights.

In Cordoba, there is even a neo-paramilitary group that has deemed itself the “Anti-Restitution Army“.

This resurgence of armed agrarian counter-reform (or perhaps, a consolidation that already took place during the height of the AUC paramilitaries), shows that when it comes to land in “The Other Colombia”, not much has changed in 100 or even 200 years.

The government´s apparently noble policy of trying to help the most disenfranchised in Colombian society is fine, but both the fact that the State is co-opted by the elite, and that the state has no little to no legitimate presence beyond the military in “The Other Colombia”, means it has neither the mandate, authority, or capacity to carry out these reforms.

The State can’t re-distribute land in places it has never bothered to show up for.

Simon is the owner of the website The Banana Plutocracy

Category: Comment, Peace talks
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Towards Peace and a ‘New Colombian Countryside’- But By Whom, and For Whom?

delacalle

Sunday was another historic day in Colombia’s 49-year war, as it marked the first substantive policy agreement reached by the oldest and strongest guerrilla force in the Western hemisphere, the agrarian and Marxist Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia-The People’s Army (The FARC-EP or FARC) and the national Government.

The agreement, on land reform, was the first point out of five on the agenda of peace talks currently taking place in Havana. The government and the FARC press release said that this reform is leading towards a “new Colombian countryside”. Over the course of three articles I will look in detail at what this means, what we can learn from history and whose interests are at work.

“What we have achieved with this agreement will begin radical, equitable, and democratic changes in the rural and agrarian reality of Colombia. It´s centred around the people, the small producer, access and distribution of land, the fight against poverty, the stimulation of agricultural production and the rejuvenation of the countryside’s economy” – FARC and Government negotiators.

So what actually was agreed?  The text isn’t public, and nothing is final until all of the points/the entire process has been agreed upon. However, according to the President’s press office, the agreement is centred around four main pillars:

1. Increase use of, and access to land by the creation of a Land Fund which will give land to peasants who either have none or “too little”. Land for the fund will come from land that has been “acquired illegally”, and that the vast majority of people in the countryside “should not fear” their land being touched if it was acquired legitimately.

Santos said that he hopes to create judicial guarantees to defend the land rights of the smallest and most “defenseless” peasants.

In a press conference, the FARC added two additional points here that they would like to see:

1) That land for the fund should not only come from properties which were the site of displacement and violence, but also land that is related to drug money, state properties, and large unproductive estates, with “priority” being given to peasants and women.

2) That social and environmental limits be placed on the production of hydrocarbons, agribusiness products, open-pit mining, biofuels and the creation of hydro energy projects.

2. Create specialized development programs in the regions where they are most needed.

3. Promote social programs and infrastructure in all of “rural” Colombia. By this, the Colombian head of state meant for national plans that would “radically reduce poverty and extreme poverty” such as irrigation, health, education, roads, potable water, housing, and social protections.

4. Increase food security. The government said that this will focus “on the most poor” and making the countryside “more productive”.

The President noted that a comprehensive land reform is necessary in order to prevent further conflicts. In a point that may generate much controversy among the landed elites is that the agreement will seek to “limit the agricultural frontier” (delimitar la frontera agricola).

The agreement also nodded at other points on the agenda, particularly the rights of victims to effective reparation, as it “seeks to reverse the effects of the conflict and to restitute the victims of forced removal and displacement.” For a more substantive breakdown of the sub-points, policies, and mechanisms of the agreement, please check out Dr. Virigina Bouvier’s recent thoughts.

It also bears mentioning that the agreement seeks a mass formalization/legalization of rural property in Colombia, given the immense amount of informal ownership among the peasantry, reaching 49% generally.

Reasons for optimism?

From a purely humanitarian perspective, the  fact that the FARC and the government seem to have agreed on what has historically been one of the most contentious issues between Leftist/armed popular movements in Colombia and the Establishment makes me confident to say that this time around, if everything stays the course, the FARC will probably demobilize.

Concessions from the FARC?

Even though the FARC´s rhetoric is to ask for more than they will get, the insurgents have clearly moderated their demands, a first in decades.

In their 1982 Congress, the increasingly strong FARC-EP passed their “Law 01” in which they explicitly ask for the abolishment and expropriation (by them) of all large land estates, land used for mining, bananas, wood, by multinationals etc. Until Sunday, a socialist/anti-capitalist agrarian reform has been their main policy position in previous negotiations.

Is peace near?

We should not confuse the government discourse about “peace” with the demobilization of the FARC.  Even without the marxist rebels there are still the neo-paramilitaries, drug cartels, the ELN, to say nothing of the absurdly high levels of violence related to “common”crime.

However, disarming Latin America’s oldest and strongest insurgency would put a significant break on the violence. No matter what one thinks of the talks, the prospect of a Colombia without the FARC is something that would be worth many concessions (and the government seems to agree).

While there has been much celebration in the Colombia and abroad, both in the media and among politicians and civil society. Semana, one of the country’s most influential news magazines, called the reform “an agreement which could settle the State’s debt to the countryside” and American Vice-President Joe Biden also lauded Colombia for the seemingly historic agreement.

It must be noted where this protracted negotiation leaves the peace process, as the clock is ticking. The first point on the agenda was was the most substantive, probably the most divisive only after the question of amnesty, and really the heart of not just Colombia’s armed conflict, but of inequality more generally.

This was no accident as the rationale was to get the most difficult point out of the way, and then sail through the other four (political participation, disarmament/’the end of the conflict’, drug trafficking, and reparations for victims).  which were set out in the pre-agreement/terms of negotiations last summer.

Although peace is not built in a day, the talks are already six months old, and the government has repeatedly said that it will get up from the table in November of this year. Many see this as giving putting the pressure on the insurgents to show some true commitment and dynamism to the process, in contrast to the four-year long fiasco of the Caguan negotiations.

Others argue that the deadline is related to the electoral calendar as Presidential elections will occur in 2014, and if they succeed in a timely manner, would allow Santos to use peace with the FARC for his re-election. It bears mentioning that for their part, the FARC have recognized the slow pace of the talks and have requested for more time.

Tomorrow I will look at the agreement from an historical perspective.

Simon is the owner of the website The Banana Plutocracy

Photo, El Tiempo

Category: Comment, Peace talks
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Colombia government, FARC “Nothing is agreed until everything is agreed”

paz

Colombian government chief negotiator, Humberto de la Calle today announced an historic agreement on agrarian reform had been reached with the marxist guerrilla group the FARC, six months on from the start of peace talks in Havana, Cuba.

Previous peace talks shied away from land rights and rural change, an issue which goes to the heart of why the FARC took up arms nearly fifty years ago. But de la Calle confirmed that at last the text of an accord for “an historic change, a rebirth of the Colombian countryside” had been established.

Details remain unknown and will have first to face the public vote, alongside the rest of proposals that emerge as part of an eventual agreement on the five point agenda for the negotiations, but many are seeing today´s news as a signal that the peace process has a real possibility of success.

While international actors, ex-presidents, prime ministers and top diplomats have lined up to throw their weight behind the talks, in Colombia scepticism about their outcome has grown over recent months. Recent polls suggest, while Colombians are willing to support the talks, the majority are rather less than hopeful they will come to anything.

Using the news of this important step forward, Humberto de la Calle and President Santos took the opportunity to ask the nation to renew its faith in the process with the former claiming, “to support this process is to believe in Colombia”.

Opinion remains divided though, and a number of high profile politicians considered to be loyal to ex-president Alvaro Uribe reacted with scepticism. Some argue that until we understand what exactly has been agreed it is difficult to judge whether Colombians will accept the proposals. How much has the government given in to the FARC´s wishes? How far have the government been able to move the guerrilla group?

Anticipating this response, de la Calle indicated there would be “an ambitious programme of restitution and adjudication of lands”, but that “legal landowners have nothing to fear”.

Meanwhile Uribe himself is yet to take to the social media to express his view. The normally hyperactive Twitter account of the ex-president remains silent.

Politicians of the left have enthusiastically supported the news with Piedad Córdoba, Nicolás Maduro and Gustavo Petro effusive in their praise.

Colombia Politics view

Colombia Politics takes a cautious view.

Our editorial line has continued to be in favour of the peace talks, and has remained optimistic for their positive conclusion, despite the slings and arrows of the misfortune of the last six months of stalemate.

At times the apparently remorseless rhetoric has asked us to question and doubt, but today´s announcement is real cause for hope.

However, the negotiations are far from over. Santos has talked of them lasting for “months, not years”, and Internal Affairs Minister, Fernando Carrillo this week issued what the FARC see as an ultimatum that talks would not extend “beyond 2013”.

Yet it has taken half a year to agree on the first of five points.

Sure, agrarian reform might be the hardest of the lot, but on 11 June the Government and the FARC will sit down to discuss the political involvement of demobilized guerrillas.

Remember, all this will have to face a referendum; and if there´s one thing Colombians appear to have little appetite for, it´s seeing señores Catatumbo, Granda, Márquez, Santrich and Timochenko in congress.

Work must still be done to move public opinion, and to move the FARC negotiating team towards an agreement the nation can swallow.

As de la Calle made clear, “Nothing is agreed until everything is agreed”.

We hope for the best.

Photo, University of Antioquia.

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Plan Colombia and the FARC

farc group

 

Plan Colombia’s success reducing coca cultivation and strengthening Colombia´s democracy was tackled in two earlier articles, here I ask how it helped the fight against the FARC guerrillas.

When Plan Colombia started in 2002 the terrorist group stood 18,000 strong. Today they are a much smaller, more dispersed, yet still dangerous guerrilla group, currently in negotiations with the Colombian government to end their near 50 year fight.

While Plan Colombia originally focused on stemming the flow of illicit substances into major American cities, the events of 9/11 and the election of President Uribe, who campaigned for hard line measures against guerrilla groups, changed the rhetoric. And over 75% of Plan Colombia’s funding has been devoted to military and police assistance.

A success?

But despite this spending and while there have been high profile successes against the FARC throughout this period, the illegal group´s ability to adapt, innovate and remain a significant threat is notable.

When Plan Colombia began, Colombia was considered a failing state, and there were those who saw the FARC as a serious challenge to the authority and longevity of the Colombian state. The ability of the armed forces to halt the guerrilla´s progress was far from guaranteed. They were fighting against a well oiled and well funded military machine in the FARC.

Academic Jim Rochlin explains Plan Colombia´s work as a process to transform the Colombian military from an immobile, vulnerable and predictable force into a rapid, all terrain military machine capable of defeating a highly successful and well funded guerrilla group.

Plan Colombia sought to provide the Colombian military with a better level of equipment, training and intelligence capabilities. It was essential the military were trained for fighting in difficult terrain; high mountains and rivers.

Plans Patriota and Victoria

In 2004, President Uribe responded by enacting Plan Patriota which saw the deployment of 17,000 soldiers in an effort to debilitate the FARC. Plan Patriota´s success was mixed. During the operation of this plan, the FARC´s military capacity was shown with devastating effect. A 2006 attack on a bus full of innocent civilians in southern Colombia became an emblem of the group´s ability to strike at the heart of the nation.

Plan Victoria however, had far greater success. A key factor in this success was the role of intelligence and surveillance. A long standing problem in the Colombian military´s fight against the FARC was their inability to locate and target the guerrilla’s group’s senior leadership.

Colombian officials would often use the ‘impenetrable jungles’ as an excuse for such limited action where raids were impossible and bombing attacks too indiscriminate. Under Plan Colombia however, real time surveillance equipment was available to the Colombian military and included the use of heat sensors capable of detecting human activity, land radar systems, command and control systems for radar, the translations of intelligence analyses, improved logistical support and night vision goggles.

Such increased capabilities came to fruition in 2008, a year in which the FARC suffered numerous losses. An attack by the Colombian military on a FARC camp in Ecuador of that year saw the killing of the group´s second in command, Raul Reyes. The attack relied heavily on Plan Colombia’s heightened intelligence and surveillance capabilities and remains one of the msot successful hits against the rebel group.

The FARC suffered further serious setbacks in March 2008 when the group’s leader, Manuel Marulanda died of natural causes and the secretariat’s youngest member, Ivan Rios was murdered by one of his own bodyguards in exchange for a monetary award offered by the Colombian government.

The Santos regime has continued where the Uribe administration left off in terms of hitting the FARC secretariat. In September 2010, top military chief Mono Jojoy was killed in one of the first acts of the new government, and a year later Alfonso Cano, then leader of group was also taken out by the army while many assume Santos was negotiating in secret with the FARC to establish the talks today ongoing in Cuba.

The FARC’s control and command communications has also been weakened as a result of Plan Colombia, and the FARC’s declining membership can be attributed to this, along with demobilisation programmes. In 2002 for example, FARC soldiers numbered approximately 18,000 while today they are estimated at 8,000.

Despite such a drop in numbers, and a four year period in which the FARC suffered severe military setbacks, the guerrilla group still pose a significant threat (if not to the state itself as they once did). They have adapted to the increasing capabilities of the Colombian military and continually launch counter attacks due to their weaker position. (i.e. they are less able to launch military offensives).

This is highlighted by their response to the military’s successes of 2008. The FARC adapted, dispersing into smaller units in an effort to avoid surveillance and initiating more defensive, guerrilla like attacks. These include multiple pipeline bombings in the Putumayo municipality immediately after the death of Raul Reyes, and the execution of Luis Francisco Cuéller, the governor of Caquetá in December 2009.

In 2010, the FARC were responsible for the killing of 460 members of the security forces – and alarmingly – 2011 produced more casualties than 2002, when their membership was at its height.

Such attacks included a bomb blast in Antioquia, the use of mortars at a police station in Cauca and the continued use of mine’s throughout rebel controlled areas. In February of this year, seven members of the Colombian military were killed by the FARC and only this week, the FARC are accused of kidnapping two Spanish nationals, although they deny this.

What next?

The topography offered by Colombia is a key reason that the FARC have been able to successfully adapt their tactics in the face of Plan Colombia, and remain a live threat. Despite significant funding, the Colombian military have found it very difficult to control the remote and sparsely populated regions.

As such, despite the FARC being the military weaker side, Colombia´s geography mitigates the government’s advantage somewhat, thus making the rebels able to endure for longer periods. The rugged terrain of Colombia, with its high mountains, dense forests and other inaccessible landscapes, favours smaller guerrilla units as they are harder to detect and defeat. They can retreat to such terrain where they are protected from an enemy with increased capabilities and thus find it easier to regroup, rearm and continue fighting.

The FARC´s current leader, Timochenko has taken the rebels into negotiations with the Colombian government (although it is understood Cano himself initiated these talks) in an apparent effort to bring an end to a conflict that stems beyond the FARC’s inception in 1964.

That this is a sign of weakness by the FARC or by Santos himself is arguable, yet while negotiators mediate in Havana, the FARC and the Colombian military continue to battle back home. There is a long way to go before Plan Colombia objective of defeating the FARC can be realised. Many see the current state of play as a form of stalemate in which a negotiated end to the conflict is the most effective way out.

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Colombian government FARC peace talks, first 6 months

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Six months ago, Colombian government officials and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) came together in Oslo, Norway to negotiate an end to Latin America’s longest running conflict. Time then to reflect on what has happened since.

Both sides are negotiating on a five points, agrarian development, political participation, the end of the armed conflict, drug trafficking and the rights of the victims. But despite the parties making the right noises on the search for a sustainable peace, fundamental differences have been present from day one.  It has been a frustrating period in which nothing – officially – has been agreed, (although the government has been hinting over the past few weeks that an announcement on agrarian reform is imminent).

The high point of the negotiations came in November, when the FARC announced a two month long, unilateral ceasefire. Such a move was intended to create an environment of peace with which the two parties could move forward. The extent to which the ceasefire was upheld throughout the FARC’s ranks however, is up for debate. The Colombian military claimed a total of 52 FARC responsible incidents of violence took place throughout the supposed ceasefire.

The top brass in Havana may have intended the two months to pass peacefully, but the FARC is a fragmented organization; something Matt Ince of the Royal United Services Institute see as the major stumbling block to lasting peace. The ability of the FARC secretariat to enforce a peace accord across its ranks is frankly unknown, and untested.

Ince argues that, as the ideological unity of the FARC has faded, alliances with serious organised crime groups across the country have grown. As a result, the formation of FARC splinter groups (interested more in the lucrative business of drug trafficking than in the political objectives of Iván Márquez and co) in the coming months is, for Ince, a very real possibility.

Throughout the talks former President Alvaro Uribe has been vocal in his disapproval, describing them as ‘…legitimising the terrorism of the FARC’. Uribe, said to building a force to fit the congressional and presidential elections next year, is using this stance against the talks as a political platform. His campaign message is effectively, yes to peace, no to FARC impunity.

Uribe attracts a significant following among those within the influential land owning, entrepreneurial and military sectors who oppose the peace process.

While Uribe´s vocal opposition should have no direct bearing on the outcome of the negotiations, it does little to aid the talks, and there can be no doubt that the slow progress of negotiations is damaging to Santos politically. His current approval rating of 47% is the lowest since he took office, and confidence in the talks within the society is falling.

The truth is, the two parties have found it virtually impossible to progress beyond the first point of negotiation. Talks on agrarian development are in to their eight round of discussions.

Land reform is seen as the key to tackling the social and economic disparity that exists throughout Colombia, the key reason behind the inception of the FARC in 1964. The FARC have been vocal in their belief that large land and farms in particular should be handed over to the poorest communities, while their disdain for foreign investment, in particular the oil and mining industries has been expressed in numerous attacks, including  pipeline bombings.

While no official agreement regarding this topic has been announced however, the understanding from Havana is that an agreement is close. Both parties have reached a preliminary consensus, a significant achievement in itself (which starts to position these talks in a different light to the last negotiations in Caguán.

It´s fair to say the teams began with perhaps the hardest topic of all – both in terms of what changes the government can promise without proposing a dramatic rethink of the Colombian state and her economic model, and what the FARC is willing to concede to.

It is understood that the FARC have relaxed their demands regarding large farm lands, and only seek those that are unproductive to be turned over to the peasant communities. The discrepancies regarding foreign investment however likely remain, and may yet provide a significant stumbling block to an agreement.

If an agreement on point one of the agenda can be pushed over the line then it is possible to see the development of sufficient trust between the parties to make the subsequent battles less arduous.

Both sides are pushed for time. Santos needs the agreement quickly for his re-election hopes, while the FARC – despite what they claim – will be aware that with Uribismo in the congress and a complicated presidential election by mid next year their hope of leaving the battle field to take up a role in the parliament will be significantly diminished.

Photo EFE

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Colombia UN Human Rights Review: concerns over impunity

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The peace process between the Colombian government and the guerrilla group the FARC today received the backing of 81 United Nations member states.

As the first day in Geneva of the UN’s Universal Periodic Review on Human Rights in Colombia drew to a close, however, a number of those present expressed concerns over what they see as the impunity for the perpetrators of state violence, reflecting the report submitted by the UN prior to the hearing.

The delegations from Poland and Austria expressed a fear that proposals put forward by the Juan Manuel Santos government for a controversial reform of the military penal system may result in impunity for state forces.

The proposed reforms would expand the power of military or police tribunals to investigate human rights violations that would normally be under the jurisdiction of the civilian justice system. The delegations fear this may lead to injustice as in cases such as the “false positives” scandal which emerged during the Alvaro Uribe administration.  The argument is that the by having the military or police force investigate crimes committed by fellow officers or soldiers the nation cannot be sure of a just outcome.

The UN’s own High Commissioner for Human Rights in Colombia, Todd Howland, reiterated this concern over the military penal system reform, and spoke of the importance of “maximising participation” in the peace process of all sides of the conflict.

A large delegation from Colombia led by Vice President Angelino Garzon presented their report which will be reviewed in the next few days before a final report with recommendations is compiled by the UN Human Rights Council. Colombia Politics will report on this.

Colombia Politics view

Human rights abuses remain a thorny issue for the Santos government. Many accuse his former boss, President Uribe, of complicity in the “false positives”, but many also remember that Santos himself was in charge of the military – as defence minister – at the time of the atrocity.

And the issue of impunity has become the stick with which those loyal to Uribe – who stand against the way in which the peace process is developing – are beating the Santos administration. “We want peace”, they argue, “but not a peace with impunity for the FARC”.

How will the Santos negotiating team come to an agreement with the FARC in which the demobilized guerrillas pay for their crimes while also being able to enter the political arena? Expect this to be a key theme of the forthcoming election campaigns.

Photo, El Tiempo.